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PREFACE 
This paper is one of three monographs on the Cement Industry commissioned as 
part of the BID-CEPAL Programme on Science and Technology in Latin America. 
The studies embraced by the Programme cover themes of wide ranging interest 
within the general area of science and technology in Latin American industry; the 
spectrum of industries being covered is wide, and includes the building sector, 
the production of steel and petrochemicals, etc. 
Besides' its intrinsec interest as an industrial sector per se the cement 
industry indubitably complements the study of the construction industry and of 
engineering firms, both identified as priority sectors within the BID-CEPAL Programme. 
Cement, as a major building material produced in nearly every country in Latin 
America, and as an important client of engineering firms, is closely related to 
these two. In addition, the nature of cement production as a continuous process 
industry gives to it similar features to those found, for example, in steel 
processing; for such reason this study also illuminates, as well as benefits, 
from the studies of steel production undertaken by the Programmé in various latin 
American countries. 
However there is a wider relevance of these monographs on cement production 
and technology than just the linkages with the other sectors which are priority 
areas of the BID-CEPAL Programme. The main aim of the overall Programme is to 
study the various ways in which local (domestic) "Research and Development" and 
related technical activities can effect innovation in production which will induce 
technical progress/increases in productivity in Latin American industry and at the 
same time expand the technical base of the productive sector, thus giving raise to 
the necessary conditions for continuing innovation in the future. 
The first monograph on the cement industry identified the technical frontiers 
of cement-producting technology and the nature and origin of innovation in this 
sector. It also analysed the channels of technology transfer and access to 
technology in the cement industry on a world wide scale. 
The country monographs are intended to examine how technology produced on 
the world market is internalised by Latin American cement producers and how the 
technical base for local innovation at the firm level is developed within the 
institutional and economic limitations set by the market and economic situation 
of the individual producer. At this level of analysis we are not concerned with 
revolutionising new process technology which will make conventional techniques 
obsolete; the first monograph demonstrated that such innovations are the product 
of large scale research and development structures which reach beyond the limits 
of cement producers and embrace heavy equipment industries, the chemical industry, 
the instrumentation and computer sector as well as other scientific branches of 
industry and public research institutions. 
Latin American cement producers are customers or clients for the innovations 
and process technology produced by this scientific-industrial complex; however it 
is misleading to consider them as passive recipients because of the fact that the 
technology they use is imported rather than locally developed. When one examines 
how technical processes are selected, how new investment is planned and executed, 
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how production is achieved from the purchased capital goods; how training is 
acquired to operate new systems of process and quality control; how the firm 
negotiates with its machinery suppliers both for technical assistance, engineering 
reliability and price, we see the firm not as a passive client of externally 
produced technology but as an active acquirer of technical elements whose function 
is to obtain the optimum technical mix compatible with his market situation, 
growth strategy and technological base. 
Seen in this light we are forced to extend our definitions of technology and 
innovations to stretch beyond the technical package of hardware and know-how 
available on the market for purchase by domestic producers. We need to include in 
"technological capacity" the process of obtaining the optimal technical mix 
required by the firm. We must include in "innovation" all the reorganisation of 
production and systems of process control effected by firms in order to make best 
use of the elements of technology imported to meet immediate productive ends, and 
all those activities carried out in order to expand the firm's own ability to 
modify the equipment and machinery and to substitute its own internal technical 
capacity for elements of imported engineering or know-how presently purchased 
externally to compensate for the absence of such elements in the firm, or in local 
engineering firms. 
Thus the relevance of this paper extends the focus on the cement industry, 
in spite of the fact that the ubiquity of the cement industry claims for itself an 
important place in any study of industrialisation. While the research on which 
this paper is based is unfortunately limited because of shortage of time and 
opportunity, its contribution lies in its attempt to go beyond conventional 
discussions of technology which equate technology with machinery or productive 
processes and examine the mechanisms by which such machinery is incorporated into 
the Latin American industrial structure. 
The author would like to thank officials from various cement firms in Mexico 
for the assistance they afforded in the process of collecting this information. 
The engineers at the Tolteca Head Office and the Atontonilco plant, the Apasco 
Head Office and plant, the Cruz Azul Head Office and plant, Cementos Mexicanos in 
Monterrey and Anahuac offices in the State of Mexico were especially helpful and 
cooperative. While every attempt is made in the detailed analysis of individual 
plants to preserve the anonymity of the firms and plants involved, inevitably 
those with detailed knowledge about the cement industry in Mexico will be able to 
identify each plant. 
Section I 
STRUCTURE AND GROWTH OF THE MEXICAN CEMENT INDUSTRY 
1. Introduction 
In 1975 the Mexican cement industry comprised twenty six plants with a 
total capacity of just over thirteen million tons a year (see table 1). 
The industry sustained a relatively high growth rate over the past ten 
years (see tables 1, 4 and 5). However there is some indication of a slow-down 
in demand following the general recession in the economy in 1974-75. Demand is 
apparently being maintained at higher-than-expected levels and a high growth rate 
is predicted for the rest of the decade of the seventies. In anticipation of the 
continued increase in demand, several important expansion projects are in progress 
or have been completed since the end of 1975 which substantially alter the 
capacity figures given in table 1. Estimated capacity at the end of 1976 was 15 
million tons. 1_/ 2/ 
Demand for cement in Mexico has grown rapidly since the war. Total demand 
represented by total domestic production minus exports plus imports is shown in 
table 2. Over the period 1940-1974, cement consumption grew over 2 000% at an 
anual average cumulative growth rate of 9,4%. 3/ During the same period imports 
have declined in proportion to total consumption and by 1974 imports represented 
only a negligible percentage of total consumption. 4J 
1J Throughout this paper the measurement 'ton' refers to a metric ton. The 
abbreviation tpy refers to (metric) tons per year and tpd refers to (metric) tons 
per day. 
2/ In the calculation of industry capacity figures we have excluded two 
cement plants. The Cementos del Norte plant - owned by Cementos Mexicanos - has 
been excluded on the grounds that it produces only puzzolanic and blast-furnaces 
slag cement and the small amount of clinker used at the plant is produced at the 
other Cementos Mexicanos' plant in Monterrey and included in the production figures 
of that plant. 
The Cementos Portland Blanco de Mexico plant at Vito, Hidalgo is also 
excluded since about 80% of its production is white cement. The figures published 
by the Camara refer only to grey (i.e. ordinary portland) cement and thus severely 
under-estimate production and capacity at this plant. 
_3/ The growth rate for each decade is as follows: 
1940-50 : 10.9% 1960-70 : 8.7% 
1950-60 : 8.5% 1970-74 : 10.1% 
4/ Exports until now have not been a significant part of Mexican production. 
However there has recently been plans to increase cement exports, especially from 
the Cementos Anahuac del Golfo plant which was recently expanded and modernised 
specially for the export market. See "Expansion: 18 June 1976, p. 80: Nacida para 
exportar". 
2. Concentration in the Mexican cement industry: differential 
growth rates within the industry 
With the steady and substantial growth in cement demand in Mexico since the 
Second World War, productive capacity has expanded to meet the increased demand. 
Table 3 shows the way in which capacity has increased during this period. However 
the expansion of productive capacity has not been equal for all firms in the 
industry; the degree of economic concentration at both regional and national level 
has increased substantially. Tables 4 and 5 show how the participation•of each 
group within the cement industry has changed since 1965. 
The concentration of the Mexican cement industry has been, to a large extent, 
brought about by the expqjaSion of existing plants belonging to the major companies 
and groups of companies, and also by the takeover of previously independent 
companies. 
Both the two largest producers have grown by a combination of these two 
methods. The Tolteca group which was owned by the British cement company APCM Ltd. 
comprised only three plants \Ln 1965; the original plant at Tula, Hidalgo, the new 
plant at nearby AtotoniliGo de Tula, and the Mixcoac plant in the city of Mexico. 
Since 1965 another new plant was put on stream at Zapotoltic in the State of 
Jalisco. In addition to the establishment of new plants and the continual expansion 
of existing ones, the Tolteca group has. also acquired control or total ownership of 
existing cement plants owned by previously independent firms. In 1960 Tolteca 
bought out the Atoyac plant in Puebla which was owhed by local capital and had 
been in production since 1927. During the 1960's expansions to existing plants and 
the establishment of the Zapotiltic plant accounted for the totality of the group's 
expansion. However in 1970 the British firm was forced to reduce their participation 
in Tolteca to 49% of the share capital; the remainder was bought by a large 
Mexican Civil Engineering group, I.C.A. Shortly afterwards negotiations were begun 
for the acquisition of three small plants on the Pacific coast, Cementos del 
Pacifico, Cementos Sinaloa and Cementos Portland Nacional. 
In this way Tolteca has managed to maintain its share of the market expanding 
its capacity to keep pace with the national growth of1 the industry. The 
distribution of regional markets between the major producers will be discussed 
below. 
The non cement activities of the expanded Tolteca's group fall outside the 
scope of this paper; however it is important to record that the group owns or 
controls various ready-mixed concrete firms, concrete product companies and gravel 
quarries, lime plants, real estate and transport companies. Some of these 
interests were acquired as the result of the reorganisation and merger of the 
group with I.C.A. In one sense these activities'can be seen as forward or backward 
vertical integration. However in a sense one could argue that I.C.A.'s investment 
in Tolteca's cement plants comprises backward integration on the part of I.C.A. as 
a construction company acquiring a major input producer. 
Cementos Mexicanos is the other group of national importance which has a 
similar market share to that of Tolteca (see table 1). The group has also been a 
combination of the establishment of new plants, the expansion of existing ones, 
and the acquisition of independently-owned plants. The Monterrey plant was 
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established in the 1920's and has been continually expanded ever since. In 1964 
a new Cementos Mexicanos plant at Torreon went into production, followed in 1966 
by the plant at Valles, San Luis Potosi. The Merida plant of Cementos Mexicanos 
was acquired in 1966. Existing plants were expanded throughout the 1960's. In 
1973 the Cementos Mexicanos group acquired the Cementos de Bajio plant at Leon 
from Cementos Guadalajara; and in 1974 Cementos Mexicanos began the purchase of 
share participation in Cementos Guadalajara's other cement plants and other 
interests which will eventually give Cementos Mexicanos total ownership and 
control over the two remaining plants at Guadalajara and Ensenada, Baja California, 
and the two smal clinker grinding plants in Baja California. 
Cementos Mexicanos have also extended their interests to pre-mixed concrete, 
concrete products and aggregates for concrete; in addition the acquisition of the 
Cementos Maya group and the Cementos Guadalajara group has extended the group's 
interests to other companies manufacturing related products such as paper bags and 
lime. 
The Cementos Mexicanos group has undergone a period of rapid growth to 
increase its national market share from under 9% in 1965 to over 26% in 1975 
(see tables 3 and 4). The growth rate of this group was much higher than that of 
the industry as a whole, averaging 20% per year over the ten-year period 1965-
1975 with an even higher growth rate in the 1970-1975 period. This growth is 
accounted for largely by the take-over of the Cementos Maya and Cementos 
Guadalajara groups which has consolidated the market position of Cementos 
Mexicanos in nearly all areas outside the Metropolitan district. 
The growth of the Cementos Anahuac group from 12% in 1965 to 18% in 1975 
of total national industry capacity is the result of quite different factors from 
those which enabled the Tolteca and Mexicanos group to expand. Cementos Anahuac 
was founded in 1943 by local Mexican capital. The Barrientos plant in the State 
of Mexico had an initial capacity of 34,000 tpy. This capacity was expanded in 
various stages, and by 1964 the capacity of the plant was 595,000 tpy. In 1968 a 
new plant at Tamuin, San Luis Potosi, went into production with a rated capacity 
of 495,000 tpy; by 1971 the Tamuin plant was expanded to 660,000 tpy and a more 
recent expansion of the plant has increased the annual productive capacity to 
1,716,000 tpy. The Barrientos plant has also been expanded and currently has a 
rated capacity of 1,188,000 tpy. 
The Tamuin plant was established with the very definite intention of 
exploiting possible export markets and from the beginning deposits and bulk 
loading installations at the ports of Tampico and Veracruz were built as an 
integral part of the plant's design. However the plant did not appear to be 
very profitable for the Anahuac company 5j in the early years and in 1972 
Cementos Anahuac were negotiating to sell the Tamuin plant to a North American 
cement producer, General Portland Cement Inc., which intended to use the plant to 
supply its Florida and South West markets. However the Mexican Government 
blocked the negotiations on the grounds that cement is a strategic industry and 
must not be sold to foreign capital; therefore 49% of the share capital of 
5/ See Latin America, 8 June 1973. The Tamuin plant was made a separate 
company in 1972 in order to facilitate the United States' investment. Cementos 
Anahuac has a 31% participation in the new company. 
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Cementos Anahuac de Golfo was bought (in cash) by SOMEX, a parastatal financial 
institution. The original company Cementos Anahuac retained 30% of the stock 
of the new company, Cementos Anahuac del Golfo and with the SOMEX funding the 
new expansions were carried out. Cementos Anahuac del Golfo has subsequently 
signed a long-term export contract with General Portland and is also reported to 
be exporting cement to Venezuela and Cuba. 6/ 
. The two plants which form the Apasco group were in no way connected in 1965. 
Both companies - Cementos Apasco and Cementos Veracruz were independent cement 
producers owned by local Mexican capital. What has linked them together is the 
fact that the Swiss multinational company, Holderbank Financiere Glaris has 
acquired considerable interests in both these companies and from the point of view 
of the marketing strategy of the two firms they operate within the Mexican 
domestic market as a group. ]_/ 
The Apasco plant was founded in 1936 with an initial capacity of 100 tpd. , 
By 1960 the plant had been expanded to 1500 tpd. In 1963 Holderbank bought a 
49% share in the plant and the process of modernisation was initiated. The old 
plant has not been totally abandoned and the current installed capacity (1976) of 
1,400,000 tpy is totally post-1965 vintage equipment. 
The Holderbank holding in the Veracruz plant is only 21% of the share 
capital, with Cementos Apasco holding a furter 5% ; however this is sufficient 
to give the Swiss firm control over investment and technical decisions, a control 
which is reflected in the terms of a wide reaching technical assistance contract 
between Holderbank and Cementos Veracruz. 
The Veracruz plant at Orizaba was expanded to 300,000 tpy from 250,000 
tpy in 1972 while much of the existing capacity was modernised. By the end of 
1976 the rated installed capacity of the plant was 560,000 tpy. The figures in 
tables 4, 5 and 6 underestimate the growth of the Apasco group and its potential. 
The Cruz Azul group is distinguished from most other companies in the sector 
by the fact that it is a cooperative society rather than a limited company. 8/ 
The plant was originally run as a private venture but closed down in the 1930*s 
when it proved to be unprofitable. The government under General Cardenas stepped 
in to prevent the plant being absorved by the British-owned Tolteca company and 
to preserve the jobs of the employees at the plant. Since that time it has been 
successfully run as a cooperative and has established a second cement plant in 
6>/ The amount which the firm exports is not clear. Two long-term export 
contracts with General Portland have been reported in the press. In 1974, the 
most recent year for which figures were available, Cementos Anahuac del Golfo is 
reported to have exported only 171,414 tons, but subsequent years are estimated 
at much higher levels. 
7J Cementos Apasco has a 5% interest in Cementos Veracruz. Holderbank 
has a 49% interest in Apasco and a 20% interest in Cementos Veracruz. 
Holderbank has celebrated technical assistance contracts with both firms. 
8/ There are many industrial cooperatives in Mexico which are regulated by 
special legislation. There is one other cement cooperative - the Nuevo Leon plant 
of Cementos Hidalgo SCL. 
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Oaxaca. Its market share has been maintained, and slightly increased over the 
years and especially in the metropolitan area it provides extremely keen 
competition for the larger groups operating in the area. 
The remaining companies account for only 8% of total capacity; all other 
independently owned plants have been absorbed by the market leaders. Cementos 
Chihuahua is the only small firm which has expanded in recent years; a second 
plant was put on stream in 1972. This company is apparently controled by local 
capital and enjoys a naturally protected market in the Central Northern region. 
Rumours that it is about to be taken over by one of the major national producers 
have so far proved unfounded. 
The other independent companies are relatively insignificant as far as 
market shares are concerned. The cooperative from Cementos Hidalgo SCL has 
maintained its existence although it is unlikely to be able to expand, especially 
in the face of the increasing influence of Cementos Mexicanos in the North and 
East of the country. The other firms enjoy small local markets which lack either 
the demand or the raw materials to merit expansion, even if the capital were 
available to such relatively small industrial concerns. 
3. Geographical structure of Mexican cement industry 
The domestic cement market in Mexico is divided into nine regions as shown 
in the map in figure 1. Table 7 indicates the market shares of each group in the 
regions and this distribution is illustrated in fig. 2. 
The Central region. The Central region, which included the Metropolitan 
area of Mexico City and the highly industrialised State of Mexico, is the most 
important in the country; over 50% of all installed capacity is in this region 
which, in 1975 accounted for 46% of total domestic production. 
The regional market is divided between several firms. Tolteca controls the 
largest single market share (32% of production in 1975) , which is divided 
between four Tolteca plants in the region (see table 7). Cementos Anahuac has 
the next largest share with 25% of the region's production supplied from a 
single plant. The rest is shared between Apasco, Cruz Azul and the small 
indépendant plant in Cuernavaca; however it is expected that Apasco's market share 
will increase following the termination of the current expansion project at the 
plant. Cruz Azul are also expanding their production capacity and both plants are 
likely to make inroads into Tolteca1s market share, especially in view of the fact 
that the capacity utilisation at the Tolteca plants has been substantially lower 
than the industry average for some time. 
The North Eastern region. The North Eastern market is the second most 
important in the country and is centred on the industrial city of Monterrey. The 
near monopoly in the region enjoyed by Cementos Mexicanos is only threatened with 
competition from the Cementos Hidalgo plant, which in 1975 accounted for nearly 
20% of production in that area. 
The South Western region. The South West market, the third largest in the 
country, is centred on the industrial area of Guadalajara. Production in this 
region is split between the Tolteca plant at Zapotiltic and the Cementos 
_ c _ 
Guadalajara plant controlled by Cementos Mexicanos; between these two plants they 
cover 86% of production in the region. The remainder is accounted for by the 
Cementos de Acapulco plant which in effect enjoys a protected local market. 
In the smaller regional markets one or two groups in effect account for the 
total production in those areas. However local production in most cases does not 
cover the whole of the regional demand in these smaller regions where there is 
relatively little cement production. The shortfall is imported from the major 
producing regions of the Central, North East, North and Sourth West regions. 
In discussing the regional distribution of the Mexican cement market it is 
important to take note of how the expansion of the major groups over the last 
decade has altered the regional balance. The new Tolteca plant in Jalisco gave 
the group an important share of a fast-growing market. The acquisition of the 
Pacific markets has given the group a 75% share of production in that area 
which may prove an important market if plans to develop Baja California and the 
Pacific Coast are carried out. Cementos Mexicanos' expansions have enabled the 
group to compete in almost every national market in the country. While the Leon 
plant is slightly marginal to the Central Region, the acquisitions in Guadalajara 
and Merida have extended the geographical range of the group. The new plants at 
Valles and Torreon have also given the group a decisive participation in those 
local markets. 
4. Average plant size in the Mexican cement industry 
The range of plant sizes in the Mexican cement industry is extensive. The 
smallest plant has an annual capacity of 115,000 tpy (excluding the 82,000 tpy 
plant of Cemento Portland Blanco de Mexico) and the largest, by 1976,was the new 
plant of Cementos Anahuac at Barrientos with a capacity of 1,848,000 tpy. 
However, as we discussed in Monograph One, an examination of plant size on 
the basis of rated capacity is confusing. Some large plants are the result of 
continual expansion and consist of several small kilns/production lines. Some of 
the largest Mexican plants are very good examples of this kind of mixed vintage 
plant. The Monterrey plant of Cementos Mexicanos is in fact organisationally 
split into two plants (the old plant and the new plant). The old plant consists 
of four old kilns each with a capacity of 500 tpd (including one kiln which 
produces only white cement) and the new plant comprises the two newest kilns each 
with a capacity of 1300 tpd and will incorporate the current expansion - a 
third 1300 tpd kiln - at present being erected. However there are also three 
other kilns on site which were the original kilns used by the firms when it 
started production in the 1920's. But to include these kilns in a calculation of 
capacity at the plant would be most misleading since they are only used in 
exceptional circumstances - to meet sudden shortfalls in production arising from 
breakdowns in other parts of the plant. 
Thus to describe the capacity of the Monterrey plant as 1.4 million tpy is 
evidently insufficient for the information to be of any analytical use. If we 
wish to use plant size in an analysis relating size of plant to efficiency of the 
plant, or the technology used in it, it is more helpful to specify that the plant 
consists in fact of two plants operating at the same place, one of which has much 
modern and large scale equipment than the other. 
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There are other plants in Mexico which contain a similar mixture of vintages 
which defy aggregation into a single plant for analytic purposes. There are also 
other plants whose production capacity has been planned as a unified and 
rationalised whole and whose technology range is extremely unvaried. The Cementos 
Apasco plant consists entirely of plant built since 1964. The original old plant 
was shut down when the new expansion was completed at the end of 1975; before that 
date the old plant had been operating entirely separately from the new plant which, 
from the beginning, had been planned as a totally separate production unit. The 
new plant now consists of two kilns with theoretical capacities of 1,000 and 
1,250 tpd, giving a total annual capacity of 1,155,000 tpy (1976 figures). 
Although this is smaller than the Monterrey plant discussed above and also smaller 
than other plants in Mexico, the average kiln size at the Apasco plant is larger 
than those of other plants, and thus could be expected to achieve technical 
economies of scale pertaining to large scale production to a greater degree than 
those plants which have a higher total capacity but a smaller and more varied kiln 
size. 9/ 
The largest plant in Mexico, the Barrientos plant of Cementos Anahuac 
consists of three kilns each of 500 tpd, one kiln of 550 tpd, and two kilns of 
1,850 tpy. These kilns have been installed between 1958 and 1970 and thus are 
relatively modern. All the plant used during the 1940's and 1950's has been 
scrapped. Nevertheless this plant is not technically homogeneous and rationalised 
to the degree of the Apasco plant and in terms of technical efficiency does not 
perform as well. 10/ 
The difficulties of using plant size as an abstract concept are therefore 
great, since a single figure of theoretical or rated capacity can hide an enormous 
variation in kiln size, which can have important effects on technical efficiency 
and unit costs. However it is generally agreed by cement producers in Mexico that 
a new plant would not be economically viable unless it were at least 1,000 tpd 
(330,000 tpy). 11/ However as table 1 indicates, old plants can survive at 
smaller scales which would be uneconomic for new producers because of the unit 
cost of capital investment and other items of fixed costs. 
It is also important to take into account the fact that a firm which already 
controls several plants may well be able to establish a plant which is smaller 
than the generally agreed minimum economic scale for new investment in the 
industry. This is because such a firm cas* offer to the new plant economies 
resulting from multi-plant operations: managerial and technical skills,advertising 
and the use of an established brand name for example which could compensate for 
the high cost of small scale investment. An established firm will consider such 
an investment worthwhile in order to secure the market in an area with growth 
9/ Unfortunately in this study it was not possible to obtain data to test 
whether or not kiln size was more important than plant size or firm size for 
economies of scale in cement production. This observation is thus exploratory, 
aimed at pointing out the problems of using scale as an absolute factor. 
10/ See Section II and fig. 3 for detailed discussion on technology and 
technical efficiency of different plants. 
11/ See Monograph One for discussion of economies of fixed and variable 
costs. 
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potential, against future competition. 12/ A plant in a region where 
communication and transport costs were such as to give a local producer very high 
'natural' protection, might also find it economic to produce at a smaller scale, 
even though its costs might be above the average for the rest of the national 
industry. The Cementos Chihuahua plant at Ciudad Juarez appears to be an example 
of this sort of situation. 
12/ There is evidence to suggest that the production costs and 
administered prices for the Ciudad Juarez plant are somewhat higher than the 
national average; however the high transport costs and geographical isolation of 
the location, plus the potential increase in demand following the Border 
Industrialisation programme makes this plant an economic proposition even at the 
small scale of 115,000 tpy. 
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Section II 
LEVEL OF TECHNOLOGY EMPLOYED IN THE MEXICAN CEMENT INDUSTRY 
1. Introduction 
In this section we will evaluate the level of technology used in cement 
manufacture in Mexico in terms of the conventional understanding of technology -
i.e., the kinds of machines and processes used and the scale at which they are 
operated. The information contained in this section is based on interviews at 
company headquarters and visits to five of the largest plants in Mexico. 13 / 
Additional information on other plants and firms was obtained from published data. 
In investigating the technology used by different producers we came to the 
somewhat obvious conclusion that the most modern, up-to-date technology was 
employed in plants which were either the largest, fastest growing plants in the 
sector or/and were plants where access to foreign technical assistance including 
knowledge of alternative techniques for different stages and processes were 
provided by a foreign investor in the plant. Nevertheless we observed that the 
internal technical capacity of a firm was not necessarily correlated either with 
the level of technology employed, nor with the relationship to foreign investment 
and access to special data. Furthermore we observed that the rational selection 
of technology by each plant was not necessarily the most 'modern' or sophisticated 
and we considered it a positive indication of the technical capacity of the firm 
the ability to decide to opt for a less sophisticated but more rational 
alternative. 
The discussion of the level of technology in this section is therefore in 
the context of the conventional understanding of technology referred to above. It 
should be remembered that the kind of equipment and processes utilised in 
production by any firm/plant do not define the totality of the technology of a 
firm since they leave out of account the various factors involved in the 
acquisition of the equipment and in the internal technical capacity of the firm. 
These aspects will be discussed in later sections of this paper. Furthermore the 
use of terms such as 'modern' and 'sophisticated' do not imply value judgements as 
to the preferability of different processes; it refers to the degree of process 
control incorporated into different production methods. 14/ 
The technology in the Mexican cement firm includes all the major innovations 
13/ The plants interviewed and visited are not identified by name in the 
text since an undertaking not to do so was given at the time the firms agreed to 
cooperate with the research. Inevitably certain information will enable those 
familiar with individual firms in the industry to identify them; however; the 
interest of this study is in terms of the general conclusions rather than the 
analysis of individual firms' situation. 
14/ This point still requires clarification. While increased process and 
quality control are technically advantageous they are only rational to use when 
the internal technical resources of the firm are such as to enable such methods 
to be operated and to result in increased productivity and cost reductions. 
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in production technology described in monograph one 15/ with the exception of 
the flash calcinators developed in Japan, However there is a wide range of 
variation between the technology employed by the different firms and at different 
plants. Briefly.the lag between the development of an innovation on a commercial 
scale and its adoption by the Mexican producer depends on various factors. If the 
innovation is to be adopted at all in Mexico it must have undergone very 
conclusive industrial testing elsewhere; there is no sense in which Mexican firms 
are willing to adopt risks by adopting a new technique which has not yet been 
proven. 16/ Secondly the timing and pace of new investment is important; more 
sophisticated techniques are found at plants which have undergone rapid growth in 
recent years, which has given them the opportunity to incorporate new technology 
and recent innovations into new investment. A third important and not unconnected 
factor is the technological capacity of the firm itself; the more rationally and 
consciously organised and developed is the firm from a technical point of view, 
the more likely, it is to select, operate effectively and, in some cases improve, 
newer and more sophisticated production techniques. In Mexico access to technical 
data on the performance possibilities of new techniques and how they could 
profitably be used at the Mexican plant is also important for the adoption of 
innovations. In most cases access to such information, and assistance comes from 
the parent company of a partially owned subsidiary. 17/ However fully owned 
Mexican firms are able to purchase such information and advice from consultants 
and machinery manufacturers. 18/ The information is not however generated in the 
country either by national consultants, industry organisations or the cement 
companies themselves without access to foreign sources. Consider, as an example, 
the lack of adoption of the pre-calcinating system. 
The main reason on account of which the precalcinating systems have not been 
adopted in Mexico is their comparatively recent development and the absence of 
long-run industrial trials of performance and costs. None of the Mexican 
engineers interviewed considered that the risk involved was reasonable for their 
company even though in at least two cases plant visits to Japan and Europe had been 
arranged by one of the Western machinery manufacturers with a licence or 
distribution agreement with the Japanese manufacturer. 
In addition to lack of industrial proof another reason which ruled out the 
adoption of the precalcinator is the fact that most plants in Japan and Europe 
where it is currently being utilised are very large plants with kiln sizes up to 
15/ See R. Pearson, Technology, Innovation and Transfer of Technology in the 
Cement Industry, IDB/ECLA Research Programme in Science and Technology, Bs. As.,1976. 
16/ This is a very rational position for Mexican producers as we show in the 
discussion of the failure to adopt pre calcinators. 
17/ If the parent company is a specialist in cement production and 
particularly in data analysis, process control and automation then it is in a 
position to supply such information. If the parent company itself is not in the 
vanguard of such developments it may seek assistance from other sources on behalf 
of its subsidiary. 
18/ Several of the machinery manufacturers have set up local offices in 
Mexico and intend to set up local production facilities. Meanwhile their local 
offices act as information, advice and after-sales service centres. 
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4,000 and 5,000 tpd, which is much larger than any plant or kiln in Mexico. 
While the manufacturers now state that it is economic for conventional sized 
kilns, much of the early literature and development was based on high capacity 
kilns and this impression, even if false, has remained firm. 
There is also some indication obtained from the trade literature and from 
plant visits that the fuel—saving factor of precalcinators is probably smaller 
than originally claimed. There is also a deep-seated reluctance to use Japanese 
equipment which represents a new departure for Mexican cement plants especially 
as most of the firms are extremely satisfied with the performance of European and 
United States equipment and are reliant on the manufacturers pre and post sales . 
engineering services. 19/ 
However one feature of this system - the fact that capacity can be doubled 
without increasing the size of the kiln, together with the smaller fuel load 
implies that the wear of refractory brick linings would be considerably less than 
in more conventional kilns. For this reason at least one firm said it was 
intending to introduce a precalcinate kiln in the near future; however to date no 
definite decisions appear to have been made. The technology utilised in Mexico 
incorporates a range of equipment from the now obsolete (for any new investment) 
to the most sophisticated methods of process control and automation. Of the 
newest, largest, and most technically advanced plants in Mexico the standard core 
equipment is the short dry kiln with suspension pre-heater. The most modern 
version of this is a four stage Dopol preheater kiln with a theoretical capacity 
of 2,500 tons a day which was put on stream at the end of 1975. This kiln 
operates in conjunction with an automatically correctable prehomogenisation unit 
for each raw material in a substantially automatically controlled plant. 20/ 
There are two other Dopol preheater kilns employed in Mexico. Plant E has one 
with a capacity of 550 tpd and another with a capacity of 1,850 tpd, which 
are some five and three years old respectively. Plant A's biggest and newest 
kiln is a Fuller (Humboldt) kiln with a 4-stage suspension preheater about six 
years old. Plant B has equipment ranging from 16 years old to its recent 
installation of a Polysius suspension preheater kiln with a capacity of 2,000 
tpd. Plant C's most modern production line consists of a FLS kiln of 1,350 tpd 
with 4-stage preheater which went on stream in 1975. 21/ 
All these plants use core equipment which can be described as modern, 
standard production technology, which is freely available for purchase on the 
world market. 22/ The preference shown for European equipment, especially for 
19/ More than once I was told that; the Japanese were offering "very 
interesting prices" for their equipment. But it was not worth the risk, even at 
the prices offered. 
20/ This plant is Plant A. The nature of the automation at this plant will 
be discussed later in this section. 
21/ See fig. 3 for complete list of equipment.at each stage of production. 
22/ Less modern plants/production lines in Mexico use what are now 
considered obsolete techniques in terms of new investment. There are 4 Lepol 
kilns, 3 wet process plants, some of which use chains amongst the plants belonging 
to the groups interviewed. There are several really old wet process kilns made by 
United States manufacturers which have long since ceased to produce cement making 
equipment. 
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Polysius and FLS equipment at these plants is representative of the whole of the 
Mexican cement industry which considers that these manufacturers provide efficient, 
reliable and well made equipment, superior to United States made equipment, 
albeit at a higher price which they have been generally prepared to pay. 23/ 
Ancilliary machinery is also representative of the standard equipment on the 
market. In spite of the fact that two of the engineers interviewed (from 
different firms) expressed the opinion that United States made crushing and 
grinding equipment was superior to the European equivalents, several of the newer 
production lines used crushing machinery manufactured by the West German firm of 
Hazemag which is considered to be the most up to date and efficient machinery of 
its kind. Plant D was the only plant visited that used mobile primary crushers 
which are something of an innovation in quarrying for cement production. The 
primary crushers are of United States manufacture and are used in combination with 
the Hazemag secondary crusher. In fact three of the five plants visited - A, D 
and E used Hazemag secondary crushers; Plant B used Allis Chalmers crushers and 
Plant C used FLS. 24_/ 
Cement grinders, which are all of the tube mill sort with different 
capacities and, of course, different .technical efficiencies, not necessarily 
related to design or vintage, 25J were made by FLS in the most part. Plant B's 
newest grinding equipment was made by Polysius which also supplied plants D and E. 
Most of the coolers in Mexican cement plants are the standard Fuller grate 
coolers which have for some years been considered as the most superior cooling 
equipment on the market. However Plants C and D have installed FLS satellite 
coolers on their newest kilns which they consider preferable because satellite 
coolers have lower maintenance and operating costs. As we discussed in Monograph 
One, satellite or integrated coolers have only been adopted commercially during 
the last decade and have still not replaced the grate cooler as the standard 
equipment. The choice of this cooler by Plant C was obviously influenced by FLS 
which is the sole machinery supplier to the company. However the choice by Plant 
D of the planetary cooler probably represents a considered judgement in the 
context of the total plant design at Plant D. 
Cement grinding equipment used in Mexico is universally the standard tube 
mill design which has to date not been replaced by any more sophisticated or 
complicated technology. The cement grinders at the newest plants are either FLS 
or Polysius although some of the older plants still use a variety of mills which 
23/ On at least one occasion where a recent major expansion has been 
carried out in the form of a near turn-key contract with a United States supplier 
the reasons given for the choice of supplier were: a) that the supplier was 
partly limited by the source of the loan obtained to finance the project, and b) 
that the prices of the European producers were too high. 
24/ At least in the latter case the choice of FLS was because this firm's 
policy was to buy all equipment from FLS who carried out much of the design 
engineering for the firm. 
25/ This is one area in which the firm's internal technical capacity can 
increase standard equipment performance. This is discussed in a later section. 
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are no longer manufactured. 
Prehomogenisation equipment cannot really be discussed outside the context 
of an overall examination of the process and quality control procedures at each 
plant. To some extent such a discussion is contained in the remaining part of 
this section which deals with quality control and automation. Nevertheless we 
will include here a brief description of the kind of prehomogenisation equipment 
employed at Mexican cement plants. 
The purpose of prehomogenisation is to preblend raw materials of different 
qualities to achieve the correct chemical composition before blending. This can 
be done either by mixing raw materials of different, qualities or by blending in 
corrective additives to inferior quality raw materials. In order to be able to 
utilise such a system effectively the plant must have the necessary equipment and 
personnel to carry out analyses on raw materials as they are extracted from the 
quarry and as they arrive from suppliers. Then the necessary calculations must 
be made to decide what corrective action need to be taken before the raw 
materials enter the grinding process. Some homogenisation can be carried out 
after grinding, but prehomogenisation is preferable since the materials to be 
blended can be intimately mixed in the grinding process. 
If the system is operated effectively the cement producer can expect a 
saving of 5% to 15% on the use of raw materials and fuels. Prehomogenisation 
together with a system of electronically controlled dosification systems for raw 
meal feeding of the kiln can also have important effects on the duration of 
refractory bricks since the minimised fuel utilisation and control of the raw 
meal feed enables the combustion process within the kiln to be more finely 
controlled. 
In our sample there were only two plants which operated a prehomogenisation 
system for raw materials. Plant A intended to introduce one with their next 
expansion project which is currently in the planning stage; the decisions had been 
taken on the advice of their machinery supplier for the project who had indicated 
potential savings as noted above. Plant B was operating a Hewlett-Robinson 
prehomogenisation unit which pre-blended the limestone and iron ore and clay before 
the raw meal stage. Plant C had a small unit that homogenised the clay only on 
the grounds that the limestone was very good quality. Plant D on the other hand 
has a very sophisticated prehomogenisation unit manufactured by the West German 
firm of Pohlig-Heckel-Bleichert which has a storage capacity of 4,000 tons. The 
unit feeds directly to the raw meal grinding plant. The blending process is 
controlled by the automated quality control proceedures described in the next 
section. 
The bagging plants used by the firms are in some cases fully automatic and 
in others the bags have to be set up by hand. Plant A has a San Regis (United 
States) rotary bagger which is only semi automatic in that the bags have to be 
both fed and lifted off manually. Plant B has similar equipment made by the 
German firm of Haver and Baeker, also semi-automatic. Plant C uses the same San 
Regis equipment. Plant D has fully automatic rotary Haver and Baeker machinery 
and also bulk loading facilities for railway wagons and lorried. Plant E uses 
fully automatically discharging rotary Haver and Baeker machinery. 
The differences in types of machinery and equipment, both core and 
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ancilliary are partly a function of age and size of equipment and partly of the 
technical capacity of the firm in terms of selection of rational alternatives, 
and the technical knowledge to use more sophisticated equipment in an efficient 
cost effective manner. The way in which product quality and the production 
process is controlled is also a measure of the technology employed by the firm. 
Although most of the literature on technology in industry is concerned with the 
kinds of machinery employed, there is too some recognition that the way such 
equipment is deployed in the process of production is of equal relevance. The 
last two parts of this section discuss systems of quality control, automation and 
maintenance employed in the cement plants visited to complete this assessment of 
the level of technology. 
2. Quality control and automation: general aspects 
The different processes and equipment described above are compatible with 
different levels of quality control and automation. While entirely different 
aspects of cement production, in many ways the kind of quality and process control 
system in the plants is closely linked to the degree and nature of automation 
which can be applied to the control process and the analysis procedures; this in 
itself is a reflection of the kind of automatic control used to operate the plant 
at each stage of production. 
Technically it is important to distinguish between mechanisation and 
automation; mechanisation means replacing human force and action by mechanical 
substitutes. Thus a conveyor belt or a close circuit control system which is 
activated by an electronic signal which sets into motion a series of mechanical 
operations is in fact mechanisation rather than automation. Automation proper 
means production and process control with feedback; this is distinguished from 
mechanisation in that the system if automatic should be capable of adjusting their 
operation in response to previously determined information. 26/ In practice it 
makes little difference to the manufacturer whether he increases his productivity 
by one system or the other and in this section we will follow conventional usage 
and include in the term 'automation' all types of mechanisation of operations. 
In all plants visited there was some form of automatic control of production 
in the sense that close circuit control existed for at least some stages of 
production, and in some cases for all stages of production. This implies that the 
discrete operations - raw meal grinding, calcination and cooling, cement grinding, 
etc., are controlled from a control panel which transmits instructions to the 
relevant machine and indicates at the site of control whether the machines is 
operating normally in terms of power, fuel, throughput of materials, etc. However 
at only one of the plants visited was there a completely automatic system being 
installed, in the sense that the whole process was to be controlled from a central 
control room and to be backed up by a computer programmed to react to information 
regarding variations in the norms for production determined by previous analysis. 
Other plants had centralised control in the sense that the control units for all 
26/ See Dennis Gabor, Innovations: Scientific, Technological and Social, 
Oxford University Press, 1970, p. 48. 
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stages of the production line were grouped together in a central control room. 
Where process control was done by mechanised close circuit techniques, the 
quality control procedures within a plant were often backed up by small digital 
computers used specifically to analyse samples of the raw meal and combustion and 
fuel coefficients and to calculate the necessary corrective action. In some 
cases the samples are taken automatically from various points of the production 
process and transported to the laboratory where they are immediately analysed and 
the corrective action calculated. Such a system is known as an on-line system 
and is generally connected with X Ray analysis equipment which carries out the 
necessary chemical analyses in a very short time. 
Another aspect of cement production which is intimately connected with the 
kind of systems used for production and control is maintenance. The more 
sophisticated the equipment and the more automated the system, the more important 
is an adequate maintenance procedure to ensure that the equipment is fully 
operative at all times. Maintenance is also necessary with less sophisticated 
technology but it is only recently when systems analysis has been applied to 
cement production that the advantages of a programmed preventive maintenance 
system have been appreciated. In such a system it is possible to calculate the 
potential trouble areas which need special maintenance and the minimum frequency 
with which maintenance procedures must be carried out at all points of the 
production line. 
Although these three aspects - automation, quality control and maintenance -
are separate issues, they are nevertheless closely connected. The following 
discussion of process and quality control at the five plants visited illustrates 
the connection between them and the way in which more sophisticated equipment 
and procedures require the refining of certain control functions within the plant, 
functions which were previously vague and left to the production department to 
carry out as the situation seemed to require. When we come to discuss the 
technical organisation of firms in a later section of this paper it will be clear 
that the refining of these functions discussed here has involved the planned 
reorganisation of technical departments and personnel within the firms in order 
to carry them out and to coordinate their operations. 
3. Level of automation at the plants 
Plant A was operated by close circuit controls for each part of the productive 
process. There were three control rooms which housed the instrumentation panels 
and close circuit TV monitors relevant to each stage. The new plant currently 
under construction would have the whole line of production from the raw mills 
through the prehomogenisations system to the calcination and cement grinding mills 
controlled from a central control room. The new plant will be designed to be 
centrally controlled according to the "one-line straight through" layout system in 
which there is a single production unit for each operation, all of which can be 
connected to the same control system. 
A study was carried out to see whether it would be advantageous to automate 
the new plant, but it was decided that there was little advantage to be gained 
from such investment. The reasons given were the kind of staff employed at the 
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plant who would hot necessarily be suitable for operating automatic equipment, yet 
were' extremely efficient in their present tasks. Moreover the -cost of employing 
trained electrical and electronic engineers for maintenance of the automation 
system made the project uneconomic. They were advised that the 5% savings on 
materials, and fuel costs would be far outweighed by the cost of specialised 
personnel. 
Plant B is also operated by closed circuit control and the newest production 
line is centralised. This firm had also decided not to install a computer-
operated automation system for various reasons. Firstly, the labour and other 
costs savings would be more than offset by the skilled labour it would be 
necessary to employ. Secondly, in the opinion of the firm's engineers, automatic 
control of cement plants had not yet been technically perfected and the firm was 
not prepared to invest in the learning opportunity which buying a computer would 
imply. And thirdly, their policy of not automating was backed up by their parent 
company who, although a cement multinational with extensive international 
interests do not specialise in automation. 27/ A further good reason for not 
automating is the range of vintage of the equipment contained in the plant. Since 
the plant has been successively expanded by adding new production lines»automation 
of the whole plant through a central computerised control is inoperable. Thus the 
investment in terms of both capital.and trained manpower could only be spread 
over the newest part of the plant. 
Plant C is also a plant with a mix of vintage equipment where the newest 
lines of production are operated separately from the rest of the plant. All 
production lines at this plant have close circuit instrumentation and the controls 
for the old and new parts of the plant are separate. A small computer was 
purchased with the aim of controlling the newest kiln according to a written 
programme but this has not been an entirely successful venture. The programmes 
for controlling the kiln operation had been purchased on tape as part of a 
technical assistance package from a foreign consultant. 28/ Unfortunately, 
while in operation it was found that the variables too often fluctuated outside 
the parameters set in the programme so that manual operation had to be resumed. 
Moreover since the data on which the programmes are based was not included in the 
package, the firm had been unable to rewrite the programmes to take into account 
actual operating conditions at the plant. 29/ 
Plant D is the most automated of all the plants visited. This plant consists 
of equipment which was all installed since 1965 and which has been planned as an 
27/ In comparison with the parent company of Plant D which is the most 
important company internationally for automation and systems analysis applied to 
cement production. 
28/ The software came from a different consultant from the manufacturer 
which supplied the hardware. 
29/ This is not to say that this small computer in any way represents full-
scale automation. Nonetheless it appears that the firm were sold a computer plus 
software package on the assumption that it could be used to control and optimise 
the process of the newest kiln. In fact the programme proved too inflexible to be 
used more than 50% of the time at a conservative estimate. 
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integrated through-line production unit. The newest kiln was erected and put on 
stream in 1975 at which date a new control system was installed. The control 
system consists of a centrally operated computerised system which controls all 
stages of the production process from the prehomogenisation unit through to the 
cement grinding mills. At the time of the plant visit all the stages had been 
connected to the computer with the exception of the primary crushers and the 
bagging machinery which had been left to a later stage. Also the kilns had not 
yet been effectively connected to the system at the time of the plant visit 
because it was claimed that there were difficulties in importing instrumentation 
signals and other electronic equipment into the country. The software which 
backs up the computer controlled system is supplied by the technical part of the 
parent company on the basis of a technical assistance contract between the two 
firms. In addition the parent company has sent a number of its own specialised 
engineers to work at the plant, at least during the initial stages of putting 
the system into operation. These engineers are also responsible for training 
key local personnel. Local engineers are also trained at the group's training 
centre in Canada and at the company headquarters in Switzerland. 
This plant can be considered to be one of the most modern cement plants in 
Latin America from the point of view of systems control and automation. In the 
opinion of the Swiss Technical Director, the only plant which can be compared 
with this one is a new plant in Brazil, also controlled by the same Swiss multi-
national. Certainly in the Mexican industry it is the only automated plant 
currently operating. The technical efficiency of the plant compared to the other 
plants visited will be discussed at the end of this section; however it is 
important at this stage to stress that the contribution of the parent company,in 
terms of trained manpower, training facilities for local staff, software for 
running the system and general technical assistance on process control is 
extremely important. This will be discussed in more detail in a later section of 
this paper. 
Plant E, the last plant in this sample, is the largest plant in terms of 
capacity. This plant is operated by conventional closed circuit control systems 
and each part of the process is controlled separately. This plant also contains 
kilns of very different ages; those currently in use were installed in,1958, 1962 
and 1964 with three new kilns installed in 1969-1970. 
For this reason it has not been considered economic to centralise the 
control systems for each kiln and production line in the plant. An additional 
reason given for not proceeding with rationalisation and automation in this plant 
was the cost of employing specialised engineers for design, programming and 
maintenance as well as the cost of training lower level operators in the new 
techniques required of them. 
4. Systems of quality control at the plants ' 
As we indicated earlier there is a strong link between.the kind of systems 
control employed at a cement plant and the quality and process control procedures 
which are carried out. The analysis of these systems at the plants visited 
clearly shows that relationship, with the most automatic plants requiring more 
sophisticated control. 
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, The quality control system at Plant A was consistent with the plant's 
pragmatic approach to automation and process control. The laboratory at the 
plant is equipped with X-Ray analysis equipment which is used to analyse the 
chemical composition of the raw materials and of materials in process. The 
standard analysis carried out covered 10 basic elements and the deviation of the 
materials from the required standard composition. The X-Ray analysis is not on 
line, so that samples are collected and prepared manually by trained operators. 
A digital computer is installed in the quality control laboratory which is used 
to calculate the necessary correction to the raw materials mixed as the result 
of the X-Ray analysis. This computer was purchased with the programmes already 
taped but the department has had to modify the programmes substantially to cope 
with the large variation of raw materials utilised. 30/ The operating of the 
digital computer and the programme writing required were learnt by the firms 
engineers at a training seminar held by Polysius. 
The quality control department also has a spectrometer which is used to 
analyse the oxygen and fuel supply to the kiln to maximise combustion. The 
spectrometer is also used to determine the size of raw particles necessary to 
give optimum efficiency in the calcination process. Training for the operation 
of the spectrometer was also adquired at a machinery supplier's training seminar. 
Physical control tests on the performance of the cement produced at the 
plant in different conditions are also undertaken by the quality control 
laboratory and a certain amount of research and development into new cements and 
special-use cements are undertaken. This aspect of the department's work will 
be discussed in a later section of this paper. 
The quality control procedures undertaken at Plant B are part of an overal 
quality control policy directed from the quality control department at the group's 
headquarters in Mexico City. Equipment at the plant consists of an X-Ray 
analysis equipment which, unlike the similar equipment at Plant A, is supplied 
automatically to the equipment from at least some parts of the process. Daily 
samples are taken from each quarry and of the purchased iron ore and at the 
secondary crushing stage samples are taken and analysed every 2 hours. The 
prehomogenisation unit is where the control procedures are centralised. Two 
hourly samples are analysed by X-Ray analysis to check both the composition of 
the raw meal feed entering the kiln and the effectiveness of the blending process 
within the homogenisation unit. The material is tested again as it leaves the 
storage silos and enters the kilns in order to be able to predict the nature of 
its 'burnability' and thus the required fuel oxygen mix. At the final grinding 
stage the quality of the gypsum as well as the efficiency and fineness of the 
ground cement is monitored. At this stage various physical tests on the final 
product - setting time, resistance, compression and expansion are carried out 
before the cement is bagged and distributed. 
30/ Note that this modification was carried out by the firm's own 
engineers in contrast to the use of the samll computer purchased by Plant C to 
control calcination. Note'too the decision taken by this firm to install a 
prehomogenisation system in the new expansion project to cope with variations in 
raw materials. 
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At this plant there is no spectrometer although a nearby plant of the same 
group has one which is available for use. The central quality control department 
of the group also has a spectrometer in the Mexico City headquarters. The 
funct ion then of the quality control procedures at the plant is to control the 
raw meal mix in order to stabilise the calcination process within the kiln which 
will save on the wear of refractories and on the fuel utilisation. Policy for 
quality control is set by the central department which also handles non-routine 
matters such as analysis of new raw materials, in conjunction with the technical 
departments of tha parent company. 
There is also a technical department at this plant, separate from the 
Quality Control department whose function is to carry out studies designed at 
increasing productivity and efficiency at the plant. While it is difficult to 
separate this kind of process control activity from that of quality control, the 
functions of this Technical Department are really those of planning and analysis 
rather than ongoing control procedure and for this reason I have chosen to 
discuss this department in terms of the technical organisation of the firm and ^ 
plant, and the research and development activities undertaken, which forms part 
of the later section of this paper on technical capacity. 
Quality control procedures at Plant C differs little from the basic 
functions outlined above for plants A and B. X-Ray analysis equipment at Plant 
C is automatically connected to the plants for the purpose of receiving samples 
for analysis. Hourly samples are taken f rom all the strategic points in the 
process (see above) and the results of the analysis are fed into a digital 
computer which calculates the necessary corrections. As at Plant B, the quality 
control procedures carried out at Plant C are directed by the policy of the 
company's Quality Control department; in the case of this plant, however, the 
company headquarters and this plant are in fact located at the same place so that 
although each has its separate staff and facilities there is constant interchange 
between them. The functions of the group's Quality Control department will also 
be discussed in the section dealing with technical capacity and innovative 
activity. However it is worth mentioning at this stage that the Quality Control 
department is the most technically dynamic of the technical departments of this 
company and that studies to improve efficiency of plant and equipment and to 
rationalise plant operations at this plant are likely to originate if not be 
implemented by the Quality Control department rather than a differentiated 
department such as the Technical department discussed with relation to Plant B. 
The quality control procedures at Plant D are in effect more sophisticated 
versions of those carried out at the other plants; in addition to more sensitive 
and automatic equipment,samples are taken at more frequent intervals and 
corrections to the materials mix, fuel and oxygen inputs, etc. are calculeated to 
a finer degree. X-Ray analysis is truly on-line at this plant in the sense that 
not only are the samples automatically retrieved from the plant and fed to the 
X-Ray machine for analysis but the results of the analysis are automatically 
communicated to the computer which calculates the corrections necessary and sends 
instructions to the apparatus which measures the proportions of the raw meal mix. 
Samples of the raw meal mix are taken every 12 minutes allowing for constant 
process control. Altogether samples are analysed from 8 set points in the 
production process and at each point corrections are calculated by the computer 
and corrections made. 
\ 
- 19 -
There are other advanced control techniques used at this plant which are 
not used at any of the other plants studied. ,To operate these techniques the 
plant has the benefit of the group's technical departments and the varied 
experience of the international activities of the parent company. The access to 
this information and to various services is effected through the technical 
assistance contract which also provides for training local staff as well. At the 
Quality Control department of Plant D there was a chemical engineer from the 
parent company training local operatives to use the automated and sophisticated 
process control systems. 
At this level of automation it is difficult to separate out the quality 
control procedures from the over all system of process control. Unfortunately 
it was not possible to obtain a breakdown of cost figures which would have given 
some indication as to the advantages of this kind of technology over more 
conventional process and quality control procedures. jl/ However, fig. 4 at 
the end of this section does indicate that in terms of technical parameters - in 
particular labour and fuel utilisation - this plant is more efficient than the 
other plants visited. 32/1 However, as we discuss in the next section of the 
paper, it is equally true that the reliance of this plant on its parent company 
for technical assistance in running the plant is extremely heavy; were the parent 
company to withdraw from Mexico it is doubtful if the plant could be operated by 
purely local staff. 33/ 
insufficient information on the quality control procedures at Plant E were 
obtained to make possible any kind of comparative analysis with the rest of the 
plants. As we understand Plant E's quality control procedures are based on X-Ray 
analysis which is not online, which is not backed up by any automatic calculation 
system (digital computers). 
5. Maintenance systems 
It has become increasingly important as the technology used in cement 
production has become more complicated and icostly, and the scale of individual 
kilns and plants has increased that there are adequate maintenance procedures 
which will ensure that'the physical depreciation of the plant is minimised and 
that the 'down time' or the length of time for which the plant must be shut down 
for repairs and maintenance is as short as possible. 
31/ In order to carry out a comparative cost analysis of the different kinds 
of technologies at the plants it would be necessary to examine in great detail 
training costs, costs of skilled labour, and to cost in some way the technical 
assistance and research effort carried out by the parent company as well as the 
price the Mexican subsidiary pays for such services. It has not been possible to 
obtain all the detailed information relevant for this point. 
32/ Again, the kind of labour involved and its relative prices have not 
been investigated. 
33/ This is discussed at greater length below. The problem is not just 
short term training problems, but the fact that,'for example the programmes for 
the computer are worked out using the company HQ's data banks and equipment. 
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Although maintenance was always carried out at cement plants it is only in 
recent years that maintenance procedures have had to be systemised in order not 
to interfere with other production aims. The most recent and complex 
maintenance system applied to cement plants is that of programmed preventive 
maintenance. In this system all parts of the plant and equipment which require 
maintenance are catalogued and a programme is worked out which determines the 
frequence and the order for the maintenance of each item. In this way all 
equipment is regularly maintained rather than just being given attention when it 
begins to cause problems. 
To some extent the kind of maintenance system adopted at each plant reflects 
the level of technology, and technical capacity utilised. It is also important 
to note the source of preventive maintenance systems as implemented by each 
plant. 
At Plant A, where the machinery and processes used were described as 
conventional and where there was no automatic process control, the plant's 
technical staff were installing a system of preventive maintenance. The impulse 
for this change in maintenance procedures was a seminar given in Europe by FLS, 
one of the firm's major technology suppliers,which was attended by several plant 
personnel. On the basis of this seminar the staff began to install the system 
in 1973 and it should be fully implemented in time for the new production line 
to come on stream. 
At Plant B the maintenance procedures were not stressed as a major form of 
improving unit costs of production. This plant, in common with all plants in the 
group were studying the possibility of the implementation of preventive 
maintenance with the help of technical assistance from the parent company. 
Plant C, on the other hand, was installing a system of preventive 
maintenance and stressed the importance of the system as part of a long-term 
reorganisation of production and process control. The project was scheduled to 
take three or four years to complete and is being carried out with a technical 
assistance contract from FLS, the firm's equipment supplier. At the time of the 
plant visit the information necessary for the full operation of a preventive 
maintenance system was being collected and coded. The information thus obtained 
will be programmed by a computer the firm intends to install for purposes of 
company administration and a separate terminal is to be installed to operate the 
maintenance programme. Both the technical assistance contract and the staffing 
of the maintenance departments (see later section on technical capacity) reflect 
the importance to this company of preventive maintenance. The project being 
undertaken at the plant is meant to be a pilot project; with the knowledge and 
experience gained at this plant the firms own engineers intend to adopt a similar 
system in every plant in the group. 
At Plant D the preventive maintenance system is an integral part of 
operating an automated plant. The preventive maintenance programme was 
calculated at the parent company's technical headquarters using their data banks 
and programmes. The necessary information about the plant and equipment was 
obtained from the plant according to the programmes set out by the maintenance 
department of the international company and the completed programme was 
delivered to the plant. Maintenance procedures at this plant are extremely 
frequent and thorough; the electronic equipment which works the automatic system 
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is revised and checked and cleaned every 24 hours; this imposes a very high 
skilled manpower load on the operation costs of the plant. Less sensitive items 
of equipment are revised at less frequent intervals - for instance the secondary 
crushing equipment is checked every seven days. The whole maintenance programme 
is directed by a Swiss engineer from the parent company whose official title is 
Head of the Technical Office. Maintenance policy and procedure are the 
responsibility of such Office which not only programmes the maintenance of all 
equipment and organises the distribution of work between the various maintenance 
sections but is also responsible for providing working drawings of each part of 
the equipment for use by the maintenance technicians. It also sends a montly 
report on all matters connected with production to the head office of the parent 
company. 
It is difficult to compare this kind of system of maintenance to those 
installed elsewhere at plants with different levels of precision control 
technology. The engineers at Plant E claim to be installing a system of 
preventive maintenance on the basis of experience in other branches of industry. 
The system, according to this firm, does not require computer programming; what 
it does require is systematic analysis of the maintenance needs of each part of 
the productive equipment. The maintenance needs are analysed by an 8-member-
strong Maintenance Diagnosis and Planning team, while the actual maintenance 
procedures are carried out by an execution team comprising 80 men. Clearly if 
the plant were more automated the maintenance procedure would be more exacting 
and require more trained personnel. However the approach of this plant differs 
from that of the previous two plants in that it bases its maintenance programme 
on the resources of the firm itself. Nevertheless the problems of comparing the 
system in this plant with that in Plant D are beyond the scope of this research. 
What is important to note is that maintenance has now become an important part 
of the technology and management of a plant in response to developments in the 
kind of technology being employed. This has enormous implicátions on the 
development of a firms' internal technical capacity necessary to operate the 
plant it purchases, a capacity which is assumed ubiquitous in most conventional 
discussions of technology and choice of technique. This point will be further 
developed in the section on technical capacity later in this paper. 
Having described the technology at the five cement plants visited and the 
control systems used to manage that technology we will now attempt a tentative 
assessment of the relative efficiency of each technology. 
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Section III 
TECHNOLOGY ACQUISITION IN THE MEXICAN CEMENT INDUSTRY 
1. Introduction 
The technology incorporated into the Mexican cement industry includes not 
just the machinery utilised but the know-how and systems necessary to operate that 
machinery and control the production process. The channels of acquisition of 
technology are various; clearly the machinery suppliers are the ultimate source of 
the machinery or hardware used in the plants. However the process which leads to 
the planning of investment capacity, and choice of machinery and processes can 
involve many agents other than the sellers of machinery. Moreover machinery 
suppliers are able to influence investment decisions by aftersales service, 
information, supplies of spare parts and credit facilities. These are discussed 
in Monograph One. The role of the parent company of a foreign subsidiary is also 
vitally important especially when the foreign firm concerned has a highly 
developed technical capacity which is available - at a price - to the local 
subsidiary. 
As we observed in section I of this paper, two of the plants studied 
belonged to firms with 48% foreign ownership; a further two are owned by Mexican 
capital - either totally by private capital or with part public ownership in the 
form of participation by a parastatal financial institution; the remaining plant 
belongs to a cooperative. The influence of this ownership patter on technical 
capacity and local innovation will be discussed at length in the followign section 
on technical capacity. However, ownership is also relevant to the present 
discussion of technology acquisition and channels of technology transfer. 
In this section we will discuss the channels of technology acquisition 
utilised by each of the plants visited, generally in connection with the most 
recent investment project carried out. At the end of the section we will analyse 
in more general terms the implications of these observation obtained from plant 
visits and company interviews. 
2. Technology acquisition policies of the individual 
firms studied 
Plant A 
Plant A was found to be fairly reliant on its major technology supplier for 
the basic choice of plant equipment and processes although design 'in situ' and 
detailed plant planning and engineering design was carried out by the firm's own 
engineering department. To some extent credit sources had limited the choice of 
machinery supplier for the latest expansion project currently in progress. 
Although there was no technical assistance contract between the supplier and the 
firm, nor is there any suggestion that the loan from the United States Export-
Import Bank was conditional on any form of outside technical assistance, the 
source of this line of credit restricted the firm to United States-made equipment 
and to certain expenditure limits. 
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As we have seen this plant is not being automated and therefore is not 
dependent on outside sources for computer technology and the software to run 
computerised systems. The standard closed circuit control systems used in this 
plant, particularly the instrumentation panels, have been adapted by the firm to 
the particular needs of the factory. 
Technical information is obtained by the firm's technical staff from the 
usual sources of open information available - i.e. trade journals, conferences, 
information direct from machinery manufacturers and from visits to plants in 
industrialised countries. One visit made recently was to a Japanese plant in 
order to observe the precalcination technique of cement production in action. 
This visit was arranged by the major supplier for the new expansion project to a 
plant owned by^  the Japanese firm for which the United States firm has a 
distribution license. 
Although this firm has a lively technical capacity, as we will discuss in 
the next section,there is a sense in which the investment situation in which it 
finds itself has made it more dependent on machinery suppliers if not for the 
source of all general information on technical alternatives, then at least for 
the specific technical information needed to plan in detail and execute their 
current expansion project. The firm admitted that the selection of equipment 
made for the latest project was dictated by financial considerations in the sense 
that they could not afford to pay for the superior engineerign supplied by the 
European firms, especially Polysius, in comparison with the United States supplied 
equipment. However it would be incorrect to give the impression that this firm 
really operates with tied hands; the information regarding alternatives from the 
different suppliers is available, especially since several of the manufacturers 
have offices in Mexico. The choice of supplier is made on a combination of 
financial, credit and technical considerations with the firm being fully aware of 
the implications of the choice it is making. Once a machinery supplier has been 
selected there is then room for a great deal of negotiation regarding the division 
of labour between the supplier and the technical departments of the client firm 
and -about the type and specifications of the machinery to be supplied. 
Plant B 
The technology acquisition of Plant B has to be analysed in a double context. 
Firstly the nature of the technical links between the firm and its foreign parent 
company have a definite influence on channels of technology acquisition and the 
technological choices made by the firm. And secondly it must be borne in mind 
that the reorganisation of the company which began in 1971 has led to an increasing 
development of technical capacity within the Mexican firm which to a great extent 
has mitigated the influence of the foreign parent company. 34 / 
The newest production line at Plant B went on stream in 1972. The machinery 
was purchased from three major machinery suppliers - Polysius, Fullers and FLS in 
addition to the prehomogenisation unit supplied by Hewett Robbins. The firm has in 
fact used single supplier turnkey contracts in the past but found them 
unsatisfactory. This firm claims that none of the manufacturers is able to produce-
34/ For more on this point see footnote N— 54, in Section XV. 
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the most efficient machinery for each and every part of the process. This is 
particularly illustrated by the fact that many plants had Fuller coolers while 
all other machinery was European. Fuller's grate cooler has been the universally 
preferred cooler until the resurgence of the Satellite cooler in recent years, 
whereas European machinery was preferred for other parts of the process, 
especially the kiln-preheater complex. 
The group's Technical department is responsible for the design of the new 
plant and the supervision of its construction, although much of the detailed 
engineering work is carried out by the machinery suppliers in the design and 
preparation of drawings for each part of the equipment. The foreign parent 
company retains the right of final decision or veto over all major capital 
expenditure and often takes an active part in the negotiation with the suppliers. 
The reason given for this involvement in the purchasing and specification process 
is that the foreign firm is internationally known and therefore has a larger 
bargaining power with the suppliers than a little known local firm. 35/ 
While the firm has access to the usual channels of technical information 
-trade journals, seminars, etc. - the parent company is also instrumental in 
supplying the local firm with technical information, especially about innovations 
in process technology and new methods of process control. However a new 
department was being set up to apply this information to cost control, efficiency 
and productivity within the group's Mexican plants and this department was being 
trained and monitored by staff from the parent company's headquarters. 
Technical assistance contract. Much of the technical information and 
assistance obtained from the parent company is covered by the technical assistance 
contract which exists between the Mexican firm and its foreign parent Company. 
The terms of the contract includes the rights and obligations of both signataries 
in the fields of technical information, assistance, innovation and other 
developments. Whilst the contract is registered on a declining cost basis i.e. 
payments are fixed in terms of Mexican pesos per ton of cement produced while the 
price of a ton of cement increases constantly because of inflation, the parent 
company is well protected from the relative fall in the value of its technology 
contracts by the fact that specific services performed on behalf of the 
subsidiary are charged separate consultance, service or training fees which are 
determined at the discretion of the parent company. 
35/ While on the one hand such a claim is true, it has to be seen in its 
context. This firm has experienced problems in trying to order ancilliary 
equipment from United States suppliers and has had to ask the parent company to 
intercede on its behalf. It is also claimed that the investment cost per ton is 
lower if the parent company does the bargaining. Since the parent company has 
world-wide interests it is logical that the suppliers are anxious to retain its 
orders. On the other hand, locally owned companies can also attain significant 
bargaining power, such as in the case of a large local cement producer in 
Argentina who achieved significant bargaining power with machinery suppliers 
because of (1) its large and growing importance in the local market and (2) the 
fact that it was known to be the technological leader in the Argentine market 
and thus influenced technology decisions of other firms. 
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Under the terms of the technology contract the local company is entitled to 
receive technical information about products and processes; it is also entitled to 
use the services of the parent company's engineers and other technical staff and 
to receive technical assistance on training and other technical matters. In 
return for these services the local company undertakes not to manufacture any 
product without the parent company's consent and to submit to the parent company's 
judgement about quality of product. The parent company is to give training and 
assistance on all aspects of project planning, design engineering, stock control, 
repairs and maintenance, security systems and process control and to make 
available to the subsidiary all relevant information, specifications, drawings, 
etc., relevant to the subsidiary's production necessities. These services are 
paid for separately, as commented above, and the local firm has no control over 
the level of payment for these individual technical services. 
In the context of this technical assistance contract it is difficult to 
judge how far the channels of technology acquisition utilised by this firm are 
dominated by the parent company. It is clear that the parent company has the 
right to make final judgements on decisions regarding technological policy; on the 
other hand, it seems to be the case that the local company carries out most of the 
ground work regarding new project planning and design and the parent company is 
only brought in to give final approval. Since the reorganisation of the firm and 
the creation of technical departments with clear and delimited responsibilities . 
the role of the local company has become more active and defined. The area where 
the effect of the parent company is probably most marked is that of research and 
development on new products. In response to several questions on the subject the 
engineers at this plant maintained that there was no need to carry out such 
activities since they were done on a larger scale and with more and better 
equipment and personnel at the company's foreign headquarters. This is discussed 
in more detail in the following section of this paper. 
Plant C 
Plant C belongs to a group in which there is no significant foreign 
participation. Nor is there any formal technology contract which ties the group 
to a single supplier br consultancy for technical assistance. However in 
addition to the normal channels of acquisition of technical information the, group 
has come to rely on one single supplier (FLS) both for equipment and for much of 
the technical information necessary to make investment decisions and execute 
investment projects. In addition the group has had recourse to other consultants 
in the field for specific assistance on automation and on plant design and 
specification. 
The reliance of this firm on its major suppliers is to a large extent 
pragmatic. The firm claims that they have very good relations with the suppliers 
and that there are various economies to be obtained from dealing with the same 
manufacturer. While in the nature of this research it was not possible to 
investigate meaningly comparative costs of new investment 36/ the kinds of 
36/ Preliminary figures indicate that the price of this firm's new investment 
is neither significantly above nor below average prices in Mexico. But such 
comparison is meaningless without comparing in detail the kind of plant and 
services bought, the cost and terms of suppliers' and other credit, and the 
quality of engineering services embodied in the plant. 
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advantages obviously accruing to this kind of relationship are standarisation of 
parts which lead to economies both in construction of new machinery, drawings and 
specifications, maintenance costs and spare parts and training of operators. In 
a firm which does not enjoy the protection of the international reputation of the 
multinational firm like Plants B and D in this sample, it is perhaps rational for 
a firm to build up a relationship with a single supplier. 
The process of technology acquisition by the firm from their suppliers 
illustrates the degree to which they are dependant for technical assistance on 
the machinery manufacturers. The firm specifies to the suppliers the output 
characteristics of the required investment and the machinery suppliers will then 
furnish alternative specifications to fulfil the output requirements. These 
alternatives are vetted by the firm's Engineering department which is then 
responsible for designing the plant on the basis of the information and drawings 
supplied by the manufacturers. In the case of smaller plants belonging to the 
group in various parts of the country, the Engineering department has carried out 
practically all the design engineering required. In the case of the plant 
visited, which was the largest plant of the group, the assistance of a foreign 
consultant had been hired in order to carry out the design of the investment 
project currently under construction as well as the previous project now in 
production. 
However, the technical departments of the firm have recently been reorganised 
(see Section IV) and it is anticipated that the need to employ foreign consultants 
for these functions will diminish as the technical internal capacity of the firm 
in these areas is developed. 
As we discussed in. the section on technology, foreign assistance was hired 
by this firm in two other technical areas; automation and programmed preventive 
maintenance. The history of the project which involved the purchase of a mini 
computer to run the kiln automatically is not clear. However it is known that the 
software to run the computer was purchased from the same consultant used for the 
basic design engineering of the last two kilns at the plant. As we saw in the 
previous section the project was not very successful and was certainly not 
conceived as part of an ongoing programme to automate the whole plant. The firm 
was not reorganised to make the maximum use of this computer and the lack of 
success of the project has led the whole area of automation to be quietly dropped. 
The preventive maintenance programme at this plant is being carried out 
with the help of technical assistance from the major machinery supplier. Unlike 
the computer project, this project is seen in a long term context and the 
learning opportunity offered by the implementation of the project at this plant 
is to be repeated at the group's other plants. The impetus to install the 
preventive maintenance system appears to have originated from the suppliers rather 
than from the firm itself though the exact channels of information are uncertain. 
Certainly the suppliers are heavily involved in the implementation of the project. 
(See Section II) 37/ 
37/ No data is available about the terms of these contracts which are not 
registered as technology contracts in the same way as those between subsidiary 
and parent company are. The main reason why they are not registered as such is 
that these contracts with foreign consultants cover specific services rather than 
the range of technical assistance covered in the other type of contract. 
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The channels of technology acquisition used by this firm are varied- and 
include all the normal channels discussed in Monograph One. The machinery 
suppliers play a very important role in the acquisition process complementing the 
relatively underdeveloped design engineering departments of the firm itself. As 
we shall see in Section IV the innovatory activities of this firm are concentrated 
in new product development and quality control procedures. 
Plant D 
Plant D is the other firm in our sample which is controlled by a foreign 
cement multinational company and, in the same way as for Plant B, the relationghip 
with the parent company has a very important influence on the channels of 
technology acquisition. 
Plant D's technology contract. Like Plant B this company is covered by a 
technology contract between the parent company and the subsidiary. The terms of 
the contract are along similar lines, although in some respect the provisions are 
more far reaching. Under the terms of the contract the parent company agreed to 
make available to the subsidiary the results of its technical, economic and 
chemical studies, its experience in production of ordinary and special cements, 
its experience in planning and organisation of cement plants and in the technology 
of cement production on control of costs. Mentioned specifically is the good 
relationship which the parent company has with the suppliers of machinery. The 
content of these technical areas is specified in much more detail than the other 
contract analysed. Specific assistance is to be given in expansion projects, and 
their requirements, quality and cost control procedures, training, raw materials 
consumption, geological research, quarry exploitation, project planning and 
execution including drawings and other design necessities and advice in the 
selection of new machinery and the introduction of new production techniques. The 
terms of the contract also cover training of local personnel in the parent 
company's plants all over the world and assistance on commercialisation and 
administrative matters. 
In fact there is little connected with technology or any other matters which 
is not funnelled through the parent company. In the words of one (Swiss) engineer 
at the local company 'There is no difference between ourselves and the parent 
company'. The influence of the parent company is detected in all operations. The 
whole process of negotiating with the suppliers of machinery, as well as the plant 
design and basic engineering, is carried out on behalf of the local firm by the 
parent company. The fact that the design team might include technical staff 
belonging to the subsidiary and that parts of the design process takes place at the 
Mexican company headquarters does not alter the fact that the parent company is 
the technical force that is important. The parent company seeks and evaluates 
tenders and designs the layout of the Mexican plant. The local engineering staff 
participates in these and other studies and activities carried out. The project 
and investment planning activities are backed up by the data bank compiled as the 
result of the international group's many years of experience in many production 
situations which in fact, according to one informant, managed to reduce the per 
ton investment cost of the latest expansion at the plant to a group record. 38/ 
38/ While this may be entirely true there is no information on how the 
technical input to the project by the group in terms of computer and in formation 
back up is costed for each project. 
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In the planning and design of the local plants, designs used by the group in 
other parts of the world, are made available for use by the local company. In 
addition norms of efficiency, productivity and cost control are supplied by the 
foreign company and constant staff training both in Mexico and abroad help to 
ensure that local technicians and engineers are competent to operate the plant 
effectively. 
In such a situation the channels of technology acquisition of the local 
company cannot be separated from the generation of technical know-how carried out 
by the parent company and made available to the local subsidiary. This is not to 
say that local internal technical capacity is not developed - the extent of this 
development will be discussed in the next section. And clearly this firm uses the 
machinery suppliers for the source of its production technology since the firm 
itself does not manufacture cement process machinery nor carries out innovatory 
developments to such machinery. The strong area of this firm is the applications 
of systems management to all aspects of cement production and in particular the 
application of automatic techniques and it is clear that in this instance, the 
automation installed at the plant is entirely derived from previous development 
by the parent company to the Mexican operation. 
Plant E 
Plant E has a totally different policy towards technology acquisition from 
the other plants in the sample. The latest expansion project carried out by the 
firm was a complete turnkey project awarded to Polysius. The reason given for 
using a turnkey option was that it was considered cheaper than buying the 
machinery from different manufacturers. However no data was produced to support 
this believe and it is likely that the lack of internal technical capacity in the 
firm which could enable it to carry out its own process and machinery selection 
and plant design and basic engineering made the choice a limited one between a 
turnkey contract with a machinery supplier and a contract with a foreign 
consultant to carry out the basic engineering functions. 
The engineers at this firm, however, are still convinced that the extra 
cost of a turnkey contract is less than the expense of maintaining an engineering 
team which would be idle in the intervals between expansion projects. 3 9 / 
The firm claimed that its sources of technical information were the normal 
ones for the sector though it placed a heavy reliance on the information made 
available by the machinery suppliers with whom it made turnkey contracts. The 
engineering and technical staff at the plant were capable of carrying out the 
39/ This is a hard statement to support or reject since we have no precise 
information on the charges made by suppliers for their turnkey services nor do we 
have them for the cost of maintaining a design team. However it is interesting 
to note that Plant A, which has a much lower capacity than this plant, has been 
able to maintain an engineering design team permanently occupied. This reason 
for not developing internal technical capacities denies the importance of the 
opportunity of learning from innovation and experiences which marks th major 
difference between Plant A and this one. 
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feasibility and pre investment studies needed before new projects got underway 
although these studies were conceived of very much as marketing and distribution 
studies. 
One of the sources of information on new developments in cement production 
which kept the firm relatively up to date with new innovations were plant visits 
to factories in the Unites States and especially in Europe. The company appeared 
to have particularly strong information links with the French cement industry. 
Because of their reliance on a single machinery supplier no outside 
consultants were used for new investment planning or implementation. Nor were 
consultants used for other technical matters. In Section II we described the 
firm's pragmatic approach to programmed preventive maintenance and many technical 
problems in the factory were treated in the same empirical manner. 
- 30 -
Section IV 
TECHNICAL CAPACITY IN FIVE MEXICAN CEMENT PLANTS 
1. Introduction: concept of technical capacity 
The present section analyses the technical capacity in the five cement 
plants which were visited in the course of the research described in this paper. 
Although visits were made to only one plant of each company or group, detailed 
interviews were also carried out at the headquarters of most of them. The 
analysis will therefore attempt as far as possible to assess the technical 
capacity of the company as a whole. 
The concept of technical capacity was discussed in Monograph One in 
relation to the ability of a firm to manage its technology, investment projects 
and to carry out innovations at different levels. While using this schematic 
analysis of technical capacity we have found it necessary to adjust the level of 
the analysis in terms of the kind of technology employed by different firms and 
the interaction between local firms and outside sources of technical inputs, be 
they foreign firms with direct participation in the local subsidiary, or foreign 
firms whose services and know-how are purchased on the market. 40/ 
In order to assess technical capacity we will use the following factors as 
indicators: 
a) organisation of the firm from the technical point of view; 
b) number of engineers and other trained personnel per unit of capacity 
output; 
c) tasks performed by the technical departments of the firm in relation to 
design and implementation of new plants and expansion projects; 
d) research and development and other innovative activities undertaken by 
the technical departments of the firms; 
e) access to and general attitude towards technical innovation in the 
cement sector. 
40/ The main reason why the schematic assessment of technical capacity 
drawn up in Monograph One is not entirely satisfactory is because in its staged 
analysis it assumes that there is no difference in the requirements of internal 
technical capacity between one kind of technology and another. The research 
carried out for this paper indicated that the capacity to run an automated plant 
is quite different from that required to run a more standard plant; thus, a firm 
able to carry out all the necessary functions in connection with the latter will 
not necessarily be able to cope with the former. Similarly a fully automated 
plant run with the assistance of imported technical know-how does not in itself 
indicate that the internal technical capacity of the plant's staff is greater 
than that of the staff of a plant which operates less sophisticated equipment 
autonomously. 
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In discussing these factors it will become.obvious that they are not 
exclusive of each other and the discussion of one will inevitably cover aspects 
of others. It will also be apparent that, due to the nature of the field work 
undertaken much of the analysis is on the basis of subjective judgements rather 
than quantitative relationships. 4-1/ Nevertheless we feel that the assessment 
is of definite value be it only to point up the areas of more detailed research 
on the subject which would give more reliable results and to bring out broad 
explanatory hypotheses regarding the connection between technical capacity and 
innovatory activity in the firms, and the ownership and market structure of 
each firm in the sector. The explanatory hypotheses will be contained in the 
final section of this paper. 
In the previous discussion of channels of technology transfer we emphasized 
the influence of foreign firms on the access of their Mexican subsidiaries to 
technology, innovation and know-how and on the kind of technology they 
incorporate into their plants. The problem in this section is to find some means 
of separating the internal technical capacity of the Mexican firm, as we have 
defined it above, from the technical factors which make up that capacity which 
are directly supplied by the.foreign firms. By wanting to make this distinction 
we are not arguing that technical transfer between subsidiary and parent company 
is not a real and effective transfer; clearly the access to technical 
information about new techniques of production and process control and the 
training provided by the foreign firm both at its metropolitan headquarters and 
by visiting engineers at the plants of the subsidiaries in Mexico has a positive 
effect on the internal technical capacity of the firm. Nevertheless it is also 
clear that the activities of the foreign firm removes from the sphere of 
operation of the subsidiary a number of decisions about choice of technology and 
process control. This in itself has a negative effect on the firm's technical 
capacity. .42/ In these circumstances there appears to be no exact method of 
separating the two components of technical capacity in the case of subsidiary 
firms and the methodology adopted will be rather subjective. 
2. Technical capacity in Plant A 
Plant A is not the most technically advanced cement plant in Mexico in 
terms of the kind of equipment and process control employed (see Section II). 
41/ By the term "subjective judgement" we refer to the interpretation of 
the information obtained by interviews and questionnaires. In order to test 
accurately an assessment of technical capacity it would be necessary to observe 
and cost each technical department over a large time period, for instance, the 
planning and execution of an investment project - task which has been outside 
the reach of the present study. 
42/ It should be remembered that technical transfer do not necessarily 
always take place between subsidiary and parent company. For example, the 
United States cement firm operating in Argentina had a policy of opposing any 
technical development in its local plants, and all technical activity was 
directed by the parent company without any training or staff development 
programmes being organized for local personnel. 
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Nevertheless we found that the company has an integrated and rational internal 
technical organisation which is aimed at maintaining its technical capacity at a 
level capable of fulfilling the technical functions required by the firm's overall 
production strategy. 
Organisation of technical departments 
The technical direction of the two plants within this group is organised 
from Head Office in Mexico City. The Technical department at Head Office 
consists of the Industrial Manager and the following staff: Sub-head of the 
Technical Department, Head of Construction and Installations, Head of Civil 
Engineering, Head of Electronical Projects and Head of Factory Production, a total 
of six qualified senior engineers in the relevant disciplines. In addition one 
of the members of the central Technical department also acts as head of the New 
Expansions (Ampliaciones) department, which is located organisationally between 
the Head Office and the plants, and comprises a staff of four civil engineers, one 
technician and seven draughtsmen. 
The New Expansions Department is a department which does not exist in any 
other cement firm in Mexico. This team is responsible for the execution of all 
new investment projects within the group, acting in a sense as project planning 
group in charge of all civil works and construction activity. The group has been 
kept continuously occupied since its formation some ten years ago since it 
functions not just for the erection of new lines of equipment but also for the 
replacement of individual items of equipment. It also supervises construction 
activity of the group which is not connected with the production facilities at 
the cement plants. 43/ 
At the factory level there are three technical departments. The Production 
department comprises a Chief of Production (engineer) plus three engineers who 
supervise each of the three production shifts; in addition there is a staff of 
three trained technicians who act as aides to the shift engineers. 
The Maintenance department is split into four parts - mechanical,with a 
stMff of two mechanical engineers; electrical, with one electronic engieer; 
electronic (two electronic engineers) and civil (one engineer plus staff). The 
maintenance of the refractory bricks which form the kiln lining are.the 
responsibility of the Production department since it is that department whose 
activities directly regulate the life span of the refractories. 
The Quality Control department has a staff of five chemical engineers and 
this is supplemented by fifteen trained technicians who work on shifts. 
There is a further technical department at the plant which, strictly, is 
part of the Production department. This is the Department of Operations Research, 
which consists of a small staff of one (civil) engineer, one statistician and one 
draughtsman. 
43/ Since this is a cooperative plant, the social activities of the 
cooperative include a variety of construction projects. 
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The organisational structure and number of engineers in the plant and at 
head office is shown in fig. 5. 
Aspects of technical capacity 
The technical strategy of this firm as we have seen is not to incorporate 
the most sophisticated and automated machinery but rather to increase the 
efficiency of the conventional equipment they have and, in parallel,,to improve 
the technical capacity of their staff. In this way the group has managed to 
retain their market competitivity with the other firms serving the metropolitan 
market. Nevertheless as we discussed in the previous section the engineers at 
this firm are fully cognisant of technical innovations in production technology 
elsewhere and have taken steps to incorporate certain innovatory'elements of 
new process and process control where these are compatible with their overall 
strategy. 44/ 
The degree of autonomy of the firm with respect to new investment 
management was largely dealt with in the previous discussion of the channels of 
technology transfer. Once the equipment is selected from the suppliers the firm 
receives standard drawings for standardised basic equipment from the suppliers. 
The Technical departm_ent of the firm which is situated at the Mexico City Head 
Office then carries out the- detailed plant design and the engineering required 
to transform individual items of equipment 'into an on-line production unit. 
The decisions about what kind of technology to use are, as we discussed earlier, 
somewhat limited by the restriction on choice of suppliers caused by the 
necessity to raise foteign exchange loans to finance, the investment project. 
However within these limitations the firm possesses sufficient technical 
knowledge to define the production specifications it requires and to make choices 
between alternatives. 45/ 
Innovatory activity/research and development 
Within these limitations the firm undertakes a certain amount of innovatory 
activity some of which can be described as Product Research and Development. The 
laboratory at the plant has developed a special cement (EAT: Ex6mpt from 
Aluminium Tricalcinate) which has a large application in Mexico for drainage 
pipes. The laboratory has an ongoing research programme to improve the qualities 
of the other cement manufactured at the plant and to develop new variants. As 
well as ordinary portland cement (Type I in the Mexican classification) this plant 
produces Type'II, which is a modified ordinary portland cement; Type III, quick 
high resistence, Type IV, low hidration temperature; Type V, the special EAT 
cement mentioned above. 
, 44/ I refer here to the introduction of the prehomogenisation unit in 1973, 
and to the adoption of a preventive maintenance routine. o 
45/ This is not intended as a gratuitous patronising comment. The ability 
to make appropriate choices between alternative•processes and items of equipment 
is an essential factor in investment management, and the realisation of expected 
profits from any investment obviously requires avoiding possible mistakes. 
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The small scale digital computer used for analysing the results of the X-Ray 
analysis of raw materials and materials in process was programmed and is operated 
by the plant's own engineers in accordance with the production needs of the plant. 
While this is not in itself innovatory it does indicate a fairly high level of 
technical knowledge of the part of the department. 
The Operations Research department, which is part of the production 
department has been set up within the last few years in order to suggest ways in 
which productivity and efficiency can be improved. Although its staff is 
extremely small it does in fact work in close contact with the other departments. 
To date it has been fairly successful in diagnosing areas where the performance of 
machinery can be improved or the process control can be made more effective. For 
instance: the efficiency of the raw grinding mills at the plant have been 
increased by 40% in terms of throughput per hour. This was achieved by altering 
the size of the raw meal particles fed in from the secondary grinding equipment 
and the sizes of the grinding balls until an optimum combination was found which 
resulted in this substantial increase in capacity. The experimental work was 
carried out with the spectrometer for which the firm's engineers had been trained 
by attending a Polysius training course. 
Whilst not strictly relevant to efficiency of production there are two 
other aspects in which the firm can be said to be innovatory. The first is the 
whole area of working conditions and internal communications. Noise levels, in 
particular noisy departments such as raw grinding and cement mills, have been 
minimised and operators are housed in sound proof offices with microphones which 
enable them to monitor the process without being subjected to high and continuous 
noise levels. Moreover the operators of the grinding mills, in common with all 
other operators in the plant have direct telephone links with the control room and 
production department. 
Another aspect of improved working conditions and communications is the 
special operator manuals produced by the firm for the operators of each stage of 
production. The issuing of operator instruction manuals is of course standard 
practice; most cement firms however use the manuals provided by the machinery 
suppliers, suitably translated. The manuals produced at Plant A however were 
written specially to inform, the ope^tor not only how to perform his specific 
functions but also how his tasks and equipment are related to the rest of the 
production process and thus the importance of his control for other processes and 
subprocesses. The object of such manuals are two fold; on the one hand the 
operator is formally integrated into the overal plant activity which is beneficial 
in terms of cooperation to meet production targets etc. On the other hand the 
operator is provided with information which helps him diagnose and solve problems 
in his sphere of operations - a kind of on-the-spot "trouble shooter". In addition 
he is able to more effectively implement quality control and potentially to suggest 
ways in which process control and productivity can be improved. 
Clearly these 'innovations' stem from the particular organisation of this 
firm as a cooperative and there is no data to indicate a real and measurable 
return from such activities, other than pleasanter working conditions. Nor is 
there any guarantee that this ad hoc approach to improving technical capacity of 
operators will in the long run prove successful in comparison with more standard 
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forms of operators' training and incentives 46/. However it does present an 
interesting possibility in terms of maximising the potential technical learning 
possibilities in a situation where skilled, experienced and formally educated 
technical staff are at a premium. 
A further aspect of this firm's R&D innovatory activity concerns hot cement 
production but agriculture.- Again because it is a cooperative the objectives of 
the plant are -formulated differently from the normal profit/growth maximising . 
objectives of other firms 47/, the agricultural venture is .still at a pilot stage. 
Its logic is to use raw materials reserves for the factory, combined with by/waste 
products of cement production to develop agricultural techniques suitable for the 
kind of soil and climatic types found in the region, and to absorb local labour 
not employed by the plant. To date some interesting results have been obtained by, 
growing standard food crops (wheat, beans) using sulphur and phosphorous 
fertilisers with carefully elaborated planting and harvesting schedules. The 
firm's laboratories and technical staff are used for the necessary laboratory 
research and the cooperative defrays the cost of the two agronomists running the 
agricultural research programme. 48/ Whether the results of this experiment 
will ever be viable depends on what kind of cost effectiveness it achieves and 
also on the problematic land tenure and agricultural productive system in Mexico. 
However what makes it interesting from the point of view.of this analysis is that 
the concept of scientific and technical knowledge in this particular productive 
unit is not strictly limited to the production of cement. Technical knowledge and 
physical facilities are being shared with other productive activities with a 
potential benefit for both cement production and agricultural production. 49/ 
The existance of the New Expansions department at the plant is another 
example of the way in which technical problems are rationally approached and 
internal technical' capacity of the firm is systematically developed. By keeping a 
coherent group together the firm has built up a considerable amount of experience 
in installation of equipment as well as in construction activities. The growth 
period of the firm began in the early 1960's, since when the department has 
participated in the erection and civil works connected with 5 new kilns, 3 grinding 
plants and the prehomogenisation plant. Currently it is involved in the new 
production prehomogenising unit. This has given the firm considerable advantages 
46/ Formal training courses are also run at the plant, and union wage 
equivalents are paid. 
47/ The firm is of course interested in minimising costs and increasing its 
market shares, but has other concerns as well. 
48/ Cooperatives in Mexico operate under a separate tax regime which 
enables them to deduct such expenditure from their taxable surplus. 
49/ The benefits for cement production in this instance appear to be 
fairly limited. They are of some significance in relation to the identification 
of the plant workers with the region and the avoidance of conflict between those 
employed at the plant and those living in the area. Yet another interesting 
alternative has developed: a chemical engineer from another plant while 
looking for suitable raw materials in a region which had not been ecologically 
surveyed, was aided fortuitiously by a botanist who was able to point out what 
flora was normally associated with the particular form of calcium carbonate 
available in that area. 
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in various ways; firstly it is able to reduce the supervisory functions of the 
machinery suppliers to a minimum. This brought a considerable reduction in costs. 
Secondly, the existance of the group obviates the need to contract out the 
construction and supervision of civil works activities to outside consultants or 
engineering firms. 50/ Thirdly, there seems to be an advantage in being able to 
judge as to the specific technical advice provided by equipment suppliers. 51/ 
Finally, if the firm's internal departments have been responsible for setting up 
the plant, designing the layout and monitoring the quality of the engineering 
works, they will probably have accumulated considerable detailed knowledge of the 
mechanics of the equipment they are using which assists them in diagnising and 
rectifying faults and failures. This knowledge is also important not only to 
keep the plant functioning but to make the suppliers accept responsibility for 
problems caused by faulty engineering and machinery. 52/ 
An overall assessment of the firms technical capacity must take into 
account its peculiar objectives as well as the level of technology used and the 
organisation of technical resources within it. Nor is there any quantitative 
way in which technical capacity can be measured for the purpose of comparison 
with other firms in the sector. This firm as we have seen is not at present 
attempting to employ the most up to date methods of quality and process control 
although the machinery it uses is modern by conventional industry standards. 
However the evidence presented in this sector illustrates that the firm has set 
up a rational organisation of technical departments which enable it to carry 
out the following functions which correspond to the first three stages of the 
model of technical capacity drawn up in Monograph One: 
1) to maintain production with existing equipment with no outside 
technical assistance; 
2) to effect small/medium modifications to the equipment to increase 
productivity without new investment; 
3) to design and carry out projects necessary to expand capacity by 
increasing capacity of equipment at an existing plant. 
Whether the firm has the capacity to carry out the design and implementation 
of an entirely new plant is not clear. The current project being undretaken is 
the construction of a new and separate production line which can be considered to 
represent a mid point between expansion of an existing plant and establishment of 
50/ In Mexico mechanical construction and civil works are normally 
contracted to Mexican specialist firms, while the machinery suppliers often play 
a supervisory role. 
51/ Several firms complained that there was a danger in, for example, 
buying a whole production line from one manufacturer with the exception of the 
cooling system. There is the chance that the major supplier could take such 
opportunity to undermine the performance of the competitor's machinery. 
52/ This was one of the problems which subsidiaries of foreign firms are 
happy to have solved by their parent companies since the latter have better 
negotiating strength to use against suppliers. 
- 37 -
a new plant. This project was supplied by a single supplier mainly because of 
credit restrictions. However it cannot be considered as a turnkey project since 
it was clear that the local firm participated to a great extent in the plant 
design which was implemented according to the firm's own specifications. 
However this schematic model does not entirely cover the analystic needs of 
assessing technical capacity in cement' firms. The dependence of this plant on 
machinery suppliers for new technology both that incorporated into machinery and 
equipment and for elements of process and quality control necessary to increase 
productivity and efficiency is obvious. On the other hand we have seen how the 
firm has been organised to incorporate and internalise technological information 
and techniques acquired from outside sources into the rational control of 
production in the plant. 
3. Technical capacity in Plant B 
The technical capacity of the cement group which owned Plant B was found 
to have developed considerably in recent years as the result of the reorganisation 
of the firm. The consequence of this reorganisation has been that technical 
functions are rationally distributed between departments and technical staff and 
engineers have been recruited to serve these newly defined and expanded technical 
roles. In the course of this development and rationalisation the firm has also 
achieved substantial distance and independence from the parent company in 
technical matters. This is so to the extent that it can no longer be said that 
the foreign firm imposes direct restrictions upon the development of local 
technical capacity. 
Organisation of technical departments 
The technical departments of the group are organised according to the scheme 
shown in fig. 6. There is a central Technical Services department which answers 
to the Board of Directors and sets technical policy and makes technical decisions 
for the whole of the firm. 53/ At the present time the Technical Services 
department is headed by a Civil Engineer who has overall authority. Under him 
are two sub-heads of department who direct the Engineering department and the 
Quality Control department respectively. 
The Engineering department has four sub-sections: Civil, Mechanical, 
Electrical and Instrumentation; each department has a staff of one or two 
specialised engineers plus two or three draughtsment. The total staff of the 
Engineering department consists of 10 qualified engineers. 
The Technical Services department is responsible for planning, designing 
and monitoring the execution of new projects; day to day production problems are 
53/ Before the reorganisation which was caused by the Mexican government 
forcing the parent company to reduce its interests to less than 50%, the Board of 
Directors, which comprised mainly engineers, were directly responsible for the 
formulation of the technical policy of this firm. 
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left to the technical departments at the plants, though Head Office personnel may 
be used to give specific assistance and to organise and participate in inter/intra 
plant technical seminars and training programmes. The central Technical 
department also sets maintenance policy for the plants; execution is left to the 
relevant plant staff although its satisfactory execution is monitored by the 
central Technical department-. 
The Technical Services department's responsibility for new projects is at 
present undergoing modification. With the realisation that production experience 
and detailed knowledge of local conditions is necessary for the successful design, 
start-up and maintenance of new plant in situ, it is intended to decentralise the 
functions of the Technical department. The new expansion project at one of the 
group's smaller plants is being carried out under a modified structure. Instead 
of the Head Office staff doing all the project planning and design, and then 
handing it over to the plant staff once all decisions have been done, local staff 
are to be brought in during the initial stages. A special Project Task Force is 
being set up which will be headed by the Plant Superintendant at the plant where 
the project is taking place. The Plant Superintendant will participate with the 
headquarters staff in the planning and design and also purchasing the equipment 
demanded by the project. He will then have complete responsibility for the 
execution of the project as Head of the Project Task Force, only calling on the 
services of th^vcentral Technical department for assistance when specifically 
required. 54,' 
This decentralisation of investment planning and execution is an important 
measure for a firm with a large number of plants spread over a fairly wide 
geographical area. The reason that prompted the organisational changes was the 
realisation that technical staff at Head Office had little experience of working 
at a plant and rarely any at the particular plant where the investment was taking 
place. Since problems only become manifested once a plant is in operation, which 
is often too late for modification of the original design, local participation at 
all stages by people with intimate knowledge of plant conditions and local 
peculiarities is clearly advantageous. The move also reflects a growing confidence 
in the ability and experience of the local plant's technical departments. 
The Quality Control section of the central Technical Services department has 
a parallel function to the Engineering department vis-a-vis the functioning of the 
plant's quality control laboratories. The Quality Control department is staffed 
by 5 chemical engineers and one geologist plus technicians. Its responsibility is 
to set the policies for quality control procedures and standards in the plants and 
to monitor their execution. It is also responsible for non-routine analysis of 
new raw materials. This investigatory activity takes place within the context of 
the technical assistance contract between the firm and the foreign parent company; 
problems requiring computer analysis or sensitivity analysis are sent to the 
parent's Head Quarters for analysis. 
54/ This project has in fact been postponed since the devaluation of the 
Mexican peso in August 1976. However the organisational changes are expected to be 
adopted as a permanent feature of the firm's organisational strategy. 
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Technical departments at the plant level 
At the plant level technical departments are mainly concerned with on-going 
product-ion problems. At the plant visited there was a total of 15 qualified 
engineers spread between four departments. The Production department which is 
responsible for the running of the plant and supervision of production personnel 
has three qualified engineers and various technicians. The laboratory is staffed 
by three chemical engineers and various technicians. 
The Maintenance department comprises a staff of two engineers from each of 
the four major engineering disciplines: electrical, electronic, civil and 
mechanical. The department carries out a full programme of corrective maintenance. 
Fully programmed preventive maintenance has not as yet been implemented at this 
plant though its future implementation is soon to be decided by the central 
Technical Services department rather than the plant's Maintenance department. 
Technical Department 
The organisational innovation at this plant was the establishment at the 
end of 1975 of a Technical department which is responsible for carrying out ongoing 
studies to increase productivity and efficiency in the plant. The local staff at 
this initial stage comprises a Superintendant chemical engineer, an assistant 
(technician) and a statistician; however it was anticipated that a large and 
qualified staff would be required as the work of the department gets underway. Two 
chemical engineers from the parent company had been sent to the plant for a 
period of two years to set up the department and to train the local personnel in 
the relevant planning and analysis techniques and procedures. The parent company 
set up a Technical Services department some six years ago mainly to offer 
consultancy services to subsidiaries and other cement companies overseas. 
Technical assistance of the kind represented by the setting up of the Technical 
department at the plant comes within the terms of the technical assistance 
contract discussed in Section II of th is paper, but is costed separately. 
Innovation and research activity 
This company clearly does rely very directly on technical assistance from 
the parent company. In terms of any kind of new product development or process 
innovation the local firm is completely passive, accepting patents and tested 
process innovations, however minor, from the parent company. No new process 
research is carried out even at the central laboratories of the Technical Services 
department; two special cements which have been manufactured recently by the 
company - a sulphur resistant cement, and a coloured cement, are both being 
produced on the basis of purchased patents. 
In spite of the establishment of the new Technical department specific 
problems in production are still solved with the assistance of the parent company. 
The problems with the newest kiln at Plant B is being analysed by the Research 
department of the parent company, this being defended on the grounds that the 
parent company has the computer, information and experience which is lacking in 
Mexico. The installation of the prehomogenisation unit at the plant was a 
solution which was generated by the parent company's Technical Services division; 
in fact the prehomogenisation unit has failed in the specific function of solving 
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the production problems associated with the kiln, though its overall benefits are 
not denied. 
Potential process innovations and modifications - for instance the 
conversion of the company's Wet Process kilns to dry process operations, or the 
installation of a Flash Calcinator in one of the plantas have been studied in 
conjunction with the parent company; while the parent company has the final 
decision in such technical matters the local technical staff carry out much of 
the research necessary to reach that decision in the context of the Mexican plants. 
What is not clear is how far such decisions take into account the potential 
learning and technical development opportunities inherent in carrying out process 
innovations or modifications. 
To attempt an assessment of the overal technical capacity at this plant, and 
in general of this firm, the role of the parent company must be taken into account. 
Although clearly the highly qualified technical staff have the capacity to maintain 
production with existing equipment with no outside technical assistance and to 
carry out modifications to such equipment, nevertheless it remains true that the 
potential assistance from the parent company should non-routine technical problems 
occur, cushions the firm in attaining complete technical independence. 
4. Technical capacity in Plant C 
Organisation of technical departments 
The technical departments of this firm were, together with the whole 
organisational structure of the company, reorganised some two years ago. The 
current situation in this respect is depicted in fig. 7. The reason for the 
reorganisation was the recognition of the tremendous growth that the group had 
undergone oyer the last ten-year period (see Section I). The group's technical 
departments are located at the group's Headquarters which is in fact the same 
location as the plant visited for this research. The discussion in Section III of 
the channels of technology acquistion revealed that this firm relies to a large 
extent on the technical support from machinery suppliers and international 
consultants. Part of the reason why this is so is again the very fast rate of 
growth of this.group which has involved the establishment of two completely new 
plants and the acquisition of four plants, plus the continuous expansion of all 
but one of their existing plants. The organisation of the firm now represents a 
more realistic appraisement of the technical resources of the firm and an attempt 
to develop those areas which are rather weak at present in order to be able to 
keep abreast of future technical developments in the industry. 
The central Technical Services department is divided into three sections: 
Chemical, Engineering and Purchasing. Each section is headed by a qualified 
engineer in the relevant discipline. The Chemical section has a staff of three 
chemical engineers, one geologist and one topographer, with two "perforacionists". 
The Engineering department comprises a chief (mechanical) engineer and two each of 
mechanical, electrical and civil engineers plus draughtsmen. The purchasing 
department has a staff of two mechanical engineers. 
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These departments and staff are in the central Technical department and 
serve all the plants in the group. They are supplemented by the technical staff 
at each plant, which is concerned with routine production tasks and is much 
smaller than the central technical departments. The plant's technical departments 
at this and other plants in the group, have the same technical groupings as in 
other firms: Quality Control^Production, Mechanical, Engineering and Maintenance, 
with a total of twelve qualified engineers in the various departments. The 
functions of these departments will be discussed later in this section. 
Functions of technical departments 
The central technical departments set the technical policy for the whole 
group and are responsible for all new investment and trouble-shooting activities 
- in fact anything beyond the normal production routine at the plants. The firm 
owns a fleet of small aircraft and the central technical staff can spend up to 
three or four days a week visiting one of the group's eight plants to monitor the 
production at the .plants, or to solve specific problems or carry out training 
activities amongst local staff. 
The central Chemical or Quality Control department acts in the same kind of 
auditory and policy setting functions as the Quality Control department described 
at Firm B. However in addition to setting control norms and monitoring their 
adherence in the various plants, que quality control department at this company 
also has a large research function which was absent in the department of firm B 
mainly because of the role the parent company plays in this respect in the case of 
Firm B. 
The Head of the Quality Control department at Company C described the 
functions of his department as follows: 
1) localisation of new raw materials; 
2) quarry exploitation policy and programming; 
3) auditing of quality control procedures in the plants; 
,4) research of new raw materials and new types of cement, and research 
into new processes of cement production. Also research into the 
interaction of different raw materials in the calcination process. 
In fact the Quality Control department in this group appears to be carrying 
out many of the research and diagnostic functions which in the other plants hereby 
described are carried out by specially appointed research departments. 55/ The 
reason that research activity beyond the expected product development research is 
concentrated in the Quality Control department is not clear. One possible 
explanation is that the recent reorganisation of the group was based on the 
previous organisational divisions and has not been completely adapted to the new 
technical functions of the departments brought about by the more up-to-date 
55/ It should be noted that this firm has no department responsible for 
analysis and process innovation, unlike Plants A and B (see diagrams of technical 
organisation, figs. 5, 6, 7). 
- 42 -
technology being used, and by the pace of competition for markets within the 
national industry. Another explanation is that the Chief of the Quality Control 
department is the most able and forward looking technical person in thé company 
and has expanded the functions of his department on his own initiative beyond the 
laboratory work normally associated with quality control activities to meet 
problems of efficiency, technical productivity and new materials development as 
he has considered them necessary. 
The results of the R&D activities undertaken by the Quality Control 
department are varied. Particularly in the area of new product development and 
the use of new raw materials the department is actively developing non-portland 
cements, especially Puzzolanic cements. Although the firms interests in 
Puzzolanic cements stems from its recent take over of a previously independent 
firm which has traditionally manufactured them, it is actively seeking to 
establish certain properties of these cements which would make them a more 
economic alternative to special cements in certain specific uses. Blast Furnace 
cements have traditionally been manufactured by one of the group's plants and 
the Quality Control department has in recent years begun to expand the commercial 
market for this product, although in the face of much opposition. 56/ 
This emphasis on the development of new cements, particularly non-Portland 
cements,was not encountered anywhere else in the Mexican cement industry and is 
significant because it represents a very far sighted R&D strategy both in the 
context of the Mexican market and in relation to the possibility of exporting this 
product to the United States. Moreover, it is an independent strategy not 
dictated by imported norms of technical efficiency, and based on an acute 
appraisal of market developments in Mexico and the direction these are likely to 
take in the near future. 
The Engineering department shows no such advanced thinking or innovatory 
activity. The department is responsible for the design of new projects and the 
installation of new machinery. 57/ The level of knowledge of alternative 
technologies and experience of negotiation with suppliers appeared to be narrower 
than at other plants visited, possibly because the staff of this department had 
not been many years with the firm. The procedure*for technology acquisition was 
described earlier in this paper - namely specifying production requirements to a 
single supplier and selecting between the alternatives offered. The Engineering 
department finds it necessary to supplement its own capacity by assistance from 
consultants and suppliers; the last two expansion projects as well as the kiln 
currently being installed at the plant visited were designed by the Swiss 
consultancy firm Holderbank, which as we noted in Section I has a controlling 
5b/ On one occasion a tender to use Blast Furnace cement in the 
construction of a nuclear energy plant, which would have meant a substantial 
reduction in construction costs,was turned down on the advice of United States 
advisors to the project. Since Blast Furnace cement is little used or known in 
the United States its use in Mexico was similarly curtailed. 
57/ The Head of the Engineering department volunteered that he shared this 
responsibility with the Head of the Quality Control department, confirming that 
the chemical engineer in charge of quality control has technical functions beyond 
those normally associated with such a department. 
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interest in two plants in Mexico. The same company also supplied the software for 
the computer which * as we discussed in Section II, was far from behaving in an 
entirely satisfactory way.. 
The majority of the execution work connected with new investment projects 
are contracted out to outside firms because the Engineering department lacks the 
personnel to mount a design team or to supervise the montage, civil works, etc. 
Putting the plant on stream and much of the plant design was left to the machinery 
suppliers. According to members of the Engineering department the role of outside 
technical assistance will diminish as the department develops its own skills and 
experience; however in the foreseeable future external dependence is likely to 
continue. 
Technical departments at plant level 
The technical departments at the plant, as opposed to the company, are 
depicted in fig. 7. The staffing structure of these departments was enumerated 
earlier in this section. As we noted earlier, this plant is run as two separate 
plants and the production depatment is split into two separate sections with both 
technical staff and shift workers being assigned to one or other of the plants. 
In contrast to other plants where the engineers in charge of the production 
departments are mechanical engineers both the superintendants in the Production 
department at this plant Were chemical engineers, perhaps reflecting the supremacy 
of the Chemical/Quality Control department at this firm. 
Maintenance department. An interesting aspect of the technical departments 
at this plant is the expanded maintenance department which has been set up within 
the last three years... The department consists of seven engineers and twenty two 
"officials" who are responsible for the implementation ef. the preventive 
maintenance system described in Section II. The whole preventive maintenance 
programme was suggested to the, firm by their, major machinery suppliers FLS and 
the firm has a four-year contract with the Danish firm for assistance with the 
design and implementation of the preventive maintenance programme. This contract 
covers all aspects of the maintenance programme from recording the information 
about the machinery and equipment installed at the plant, to analysing the 
relevant programming and planning the execution of the programme with conventional 
planning techniques such as flow diagrammes, Critical Path, etc. The contract 
also covers the necessary training of the technical .staff. However it is intended 
that the maintenance programme being implemented at this plant will be a pilot 
project and that at a later stage it is intended that similar programmes be 
applied in other plants in the group using the expertise and know-how accumulated 
in the pilot project without further technical assistance. 
Innovation 
At the plant level there was no evidence of interest in innovations - either 
product or process innovations - apart from the concern with the maintenance 
programme and the conviction that the maintenance programme would be an economic 
advantage to the plant. 
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' Technical capacity in Firm C 
This firm is apparently at a transitional stage in developing its internal 
technical capacity, largely because of the rapid rate of growth it has undergone 
in recent years and the subsequent reorganisation it had to suffer to adapt 
itself to the new plants and capacity'it has acquired. At present the technical 
level of the various departments is very uneven. In the engineering departments 
there was a clear admission that much of the engineering tasks connected with 
new investment design and execution was not even attempted by the firm. The same 
departments demonstrated an uncritical faith in their major machinery suppliers 
which may have been based on satisfactory past experience, though the hypothesis 
cannot be rejected that it is based on lack of knowledge or sufficient interest 
in investigating alternatives. 
On the other hand in terms of long term policy there were certain clear 
policy decisions which indicated that the firm intends to develop its technical 
capacity to meet its requirements in the future. The Quality Control department 
was concerned with the development of special cements and the introduction of 
non-portland cements in the Mexican market and elsewhere which would result in 
considerable fuel and raw materials savings. All the major areas where the firm 
was currently seeking to improve the level of its technology with outside 
technical assistance were seen very much as pilot projects. Consultancy 
assistance in design of new projects at the firm's largest and most up-to-date 
plant were contracted in the hope that the expertise gained is due to serve 
the group's other plants with no additional outside assistance. The same policy 
was apparently behind the contract to implement the maintenance programme at the 
plant, as we discuss above. 
It is therefore difficult to assess Firm C's,technical capacity in terms of 
the five stage categories outlined in Monograph One. Existing equipment is 
clearly operated without outside technical assistance; however there was no 
evidence at the plant visited of any minor innovations or modifications being .. 
introduced to expand existing capacity on the basis of already installed 
equipment. New lines of production are not installed by the firm without 
assistance, which is required both from machinery suppliers and from foreign 
consultants although the Head Office's Technical department insists that lines 
of production at the smaller plants are designed without outside cooperation. 
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The attitude of this firm towards the idea of independence from technical 
assistance of any kind is in marked contrast to that of the two other firms in 
the sector discussed so far. The reliance on the machinery suppliers was not 
questioned; nor was the lack of design capacity in the Engineering departments. 
The experiment with automation of the kiln which had, been largely a failure, was 
not being followed up by a more in-depth study of automation of the plant and 
interest in the latest process innovation - precalcination was limited on the 
grounds that it was not as yet a commercial proposition. 
One of the reasons for this apparent disregard for the importance in terms 
of competitivity of technical innovations, and the continuing reliance on one 
Supplier- is that until recently this firm had a near-monopoly in the North-Eastern 
region of the country and did not compete in other important national markets. 
However since the recent spate of mergers, take overs and plant expansions the 
firm now. competes in almost all the nationally important markets. Nevertheless 
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the termination of its protected position will take some time to influence its 
technical policy. 
5. Technical capacity in Plant D 
In discussing the technical capacity in Firm D there is a problem of 
separating the local technical capacity from that supplied directly or, al least 
made possible, by the parent company. In the discussion of Section II we have 
seen that the technology employed at this plant is the most sophisticated and 
technically efficient of all the cement plants visited in the course of this 
investigation. However the discussion in Section III of the channels of 
technology acquisition makes it quite clear the extent of the firm's dependence 
on the parent company for the technology - both process technology and control 
methods - employed at the plant. 
Technical organisation of the firm 
The technical organisation of the firm reflects the intimate intervention 
of the parent company in the running of the local subsidiary. The influence of 
the parent company in this respect is underlined when it is noted that 
a) the senior technical personnel are Swiss; and 
b) none of the technical staff working for the company when the Swiss 
company purchased its 48% share in 1963, are still employed at the 
plant. 
The technical departments are organised under a (Swiss) Technical Director 
located at the Mexico City Headquarters of the firm (see fig. 8). Although he is 
legally an employee of the Mexican company his appointment was made by the parent 
company and his identification with the parent company is very strong. The 
Technical Services department at the Mexico City office coordinated the relations 
between the Mexican company and the parent company. Its direct responsibilities 
include the design and implementation of new projects and the establishment of 
control policies - quality control, automation procedures and maintenance 
procedures for the plant. There are only five members of the Technical department 
who are based in Mexico City, the rest of the engineers are based at the plant in 
the State of Mexico. Only a minimum engineering staff - civil and mechanical 
engineers who are employed in designing and modifying the plant under installation 
are retained at the Mexico City office for the purpose of collaboration with the 
machinery suppliers and with the Technical Services departments of the parent 
company. 
The technical departments at the plant, while under the ultimate 
hierarchical control, of the Mexico City office, are grouped under a Superintendant 
of Production who has control over all the production departments at the plant. 
The Production Superintendant, which is the most important technical post at the 
plant is filled by a Mexican engineer who was trained for twelve months at the 
parent company's headquarters in Switzerland. 
The departments grouped under the Production Superintendant are Process, 
Quality Control, Instrumentation and Maintenance. The Process department is 
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equivalent to the production department in other plants. It is staffed by four 
Production Chiefs who are chemical engineers as well as the three Shift 
Superintendants and the employees. The Quality Control department whose 
functions were described in Section 2 has a staff of two chemical engineers and 
three analysts in addition to the non-qualified workers. The Instrumentation 
department is in charge of the automation system and in particular its maintenance. 
It is headed by two electronic engineers who have a staff-of eight. The other 
Maintenance departments - Mechanical and Electrical have a staff of two engineers 
each in the relevant disciplines, plus technicians and non-qualified employees. 
All the staff in the Instrumentation department had been trained by the 
parent company at their Canadian Technical Department which is their centre for 
all activities on the American Continent. The Quality Control department had been 
set up by Swiss engineers and at the time of the plant visit there was an engineer 
from the company's Head Office training local staff in the use of the X-Ray 
analysis equipment. Before such equipment and the necessary analysis had been 
carried out on behalf of the Mexican company at the Canadian Headquarters. However 
the Mexican staff have now all undergone sufficient training, apart from the 
training programmes currently in progress and are competent to carry out the 
required procedures. 
Role of parent company 
Because of the interdependence with the parent company it is not possible to 
asses the technical capacity of the local company in the same way as with other 
plants. The efficiency of the plant, and the level of technology employed, is 
beyond doubt one of the highest in the Mexican cenent innustrv (see Section II). 
But this technical efficiency was achieved with the aid of a large infusion of 
•assistance from the Swiss parent company which is one of the world leaders in 
cement process technology. In the previous section we discussed the dependency of 
the Mexican plant in terms of the supply of data and programmes necessary to make 
effective the automatic control system installed at the plant. A similar dependency 
exists in terms of the relevant training of Mexican manpower to operate these 
systems. While high level technical training is available in Mexico, specific 
in-plant training is- necessary to supplement the general disciplines and make the 
operative familiar with the machinery and processes he is required to operate and 
monitor. Nor would it be realistic to assume that once the first round of training 
personnel is completed the Mexican subsidiary will be self-sufficient in the 
provision of suitable engineers to run the installations. If the group continues 
to expand in order to maintain and increase their market share, more trained 
personnel will be required. Moreover this -plant is likely to adopt process 
innovations in advance of its competitors and such innovatory action will come at 
the instigation of the parent company and will most probably involve a further 
influx of trained and experienced personnel 
Innovation and research 
Innovatory activity, some of which comes under the heading of Research and 
Development, is undertaken at this plant, although as in previous cases the 
capacity to carry out such activities is clearly derived from the parent company. 
As far as new cements and new uses of cements is concerned the reliance on the 
parent company is complete. A patent has just been bought which will enable the 
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Mexican subsidiary to manufacture Oil Well cement and it is considered more 
economic to acquire the patent from the parent company than to finance any 
autonomous research activity in the Mexican laboratories. Some problems which are 
specific to the fact that the plant operates in Mexico are tackled by the Mexican 
staff. One of these problems is the unsatisfactory nature of locally produced 
refractory bricks and the impossibility of importing them due to government 
regulation. In order to overcome these problems the firm has analysed a variety 
of imported bricks and cooperated with the refractory manufacturers in developing 
a local imitation of the imported ones. 
Other minor innovations include the conversion of the origins! raw meal mills 
to finish mills in order to conform with the recently issued anti-polution 
legislation. The combination of more efficient dust reclamation and accurate 
process control has resulted in the actual capacity of plant being increased above 
the theoretical capacity by up to 20%. 
Such minor innovations are a direct response to the Mexican manufacturing 
situation, and as such have to be carried out at the plant level even if the 
expertise originates abroad. Without doubt such innovatory activities yield a 
learning by-product for the Mexican staff involved and adds to the indigenous 
technical capacity in this respect. However, any assessment of the internal 
technical capacity of the Mexican subsidiary must conclude that to date such 
capacity is dependent on external stimulus and assistance in the selection of 
technical problems it chooses to solve, as well as in the nature of the innovatory 
activities carried out at the Mexican plant. 
Other technical tasks implying certain degrees of technical capacity are 
similarly modified by the interaction with the parent company. The firm carries 
out its own pre-investment studies for new projects and negotiates directly with 
the suppliers the division of technical duties between the machinery manufacturers 
and the clients in the execution of the project. A substantial amount of the 
design engineering is carried out by the Mexican firm whose engineering staff are 
well trained, experienced and capable. However the parent company reserves the 
right to make the final decision on all investment expenditure and, under the 
terms of the technical assistance contract, the parent company can participate 
actively in the project design and negotiations with suppliers. In terms of 
innovation in the production process and process control the firm is apparently 
very dependent on the assistance of the parent company. The Technical department 
at the plant visited required the full time input of two engineers from Head 
Office for at least two years to set up the department and train local staff in 
the procedures necessary to monitor production, analyse bottlenecks, and identify 
the causes of low efficiency and of less-than-expected productivity. 
Product research was virtually non-existent at the plant visited and an 
interview with the Laboratory department at the Mexican Head office indicated 
that new product development was not considered an economic proposition by the 
local firm, since they received patents for new cements from the parent company. 
This contrasts with the development activities carried out at one of the firms 
previously described (Firm A) which with inferior equipment carries out an ongoing 
Research and Development project to develop new cements for the Mexican market. 
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6. Plant E 
The information obtained regarding Plant E was insufficient to carry out an 
analysis of technical capacity in the manner of the other plants visited. From 
the information at hand and that contained in the previous sections we are able 
to note that to a large extent this plant relies on machinery suppliers especially 
for the design and implementation of new investment projects. Installed equipment 
can be run by the firm's own staff without outside assistance though it must be 
remembered that the level of technology embodied in that equipment is not as 
advanced as in some other plants in the Mexican cement industry. Little interest 
was manifested in any kind of research or innovatory activity and what activities 
thére were which were designed to maintain and increase the plant's market share 
were concentrated on sales and marketing techniques. The chemical engineer who 
is in charge of all plant operations (Gerente de Operaciones) has only been with 
the company some two years - he was brought in to revitalise the company and 
increase its influence in the national market following the administrative 
separation of this plant from other plants in the same group. The previous 
experience of this engineer has not been in the cement but in the chemical 
industry and he tends to approach technical problems with a pragmatic viewpoint 
not often seen in the cement industry. Nevertheless his knowledge of technical 
innovations in the sector in general is very up-to-date and the decisions not to 
adopt certain process innovations - such as automation or pre-calcination are 
based on a rational assessment of the plant's operations and staff. 
7. Summary and interpretation of information regarding internal technical 
capacity of the five plants/companies visited 
The information we obtained regarding various factors which we included in 
our assessment of internal technical capacity enables us to make some relative 
assessments of the nature of technical capacity in each firm and the relationship 
between that capacity and explanatory factors like ownership structure, 
participation of foreign consultants, technical organisation, etc. 
However, the information also points up the intense difficulties of making 
quantitative assessments of technical capacity. One measure of technical 
capacity would be to calculate the number of qualified engineers employed by the 
plant and'weight this according to its size. The first problem here is how to 
compute the technical staff which are located at the group's Head Office and which 
serve other plants in the group as well,even though their efforts in many places 
may well be concentrated on the largest plant in the group. Disregarding this 
and calculating the entire engineering staff at the plant plus headquarters in 
relation to the productive capacity of the largest plant in the group we find 
that Plant A has one engineer per 32,450 tpy capacity; Plant B one per 36,666 
tpy; Plant C one per 46,200; and Plant D one engineer for 64,200. If we use 
these ratios as a measurement of technical capacity we find that there is the 
highest concentration of technical capacity in Plant A and the lowest in Plant D. 
However we have to consider the possibility of there being economies of 
scale which enable the internal technical capacity of a firm/plant to be 
maintained with no increase in technical staff over a larger productive capacity. 
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Since Plant A's capacity in 1976 was lower than that of any of the other plants 
for which this ratio has been calculated we could assume that, following the 
increase in capacity at Plant A currently under construction, the engineer/ 
capacity ratio will drop consideraré since few extra engineers will need to be 
recruited to run the expanded plant. ' 
Another reason for the apparent discrepancy in these ratios is that Plant 
D is the only one in the sample for which the engineering staff serves just this 
individual facility and no other in the group. In this situation it is 
reasonable to assume that extra engineering staff at the other plants' 
headquarters are occupied at least some of the time in technical matters 
concerning other plants in the group. Also there is the problem of "quality" of 
technical staff. Fig. 4 (Section II) shows that in terms of technical 
efficiency Plant D is in most respects more advanced than the other plants in 
the sample. The subsequent analysis in Section III and IV shows that much of 
Plant D's technical capability has been trained by its foreign parent company 
and that the foreign firm provides many technical services which have greatly 
assisted the plant to reach the standards of technical efficiency indicated by 
these figures. Furthermore there is also the question of different technology 
being employed at the different plants, some of which is more efficient in terms 
of unit output than others. 
A more fruitful approach and one which is in accordance with the main 
directions of the ECLA/IDB overall research project is. to try to assess 
technical capacity in terms of the ability of the firm to assimilate major 
innovations generated elsewhere and their ability to generate local innovations 
in the form of minor modifications to process equipment and control and of new 
product research and development for the local market. In the context of this 
study it became clear that the nature of innovation in cement producing 
technology has been such that local Mexican producers have found it necessary 
to consciously organise their technical departments in order to manage complex 
systems of process and quality control, automation, maintenance systems and new 
product development. Not all firms have approached this problems in a direct 
manner. Firm A,in spite of its relatively small size and less advanced 
technology (see Section II), has evolved an organisational structure which is 
aimed at maximising the internal technical capacity on two important aspects: 
firstly, the whole area of new investment management including design, 
procurement, construction, supervision and putting on stream of new plants has 
been for some years coordinated by the New Expansions department which is a 
technical group not seen in any other plant visited. The existence of this 
department, as well as being a rational response to the obvious problems of 
investment management and implementation in the face of increasingly complex 
and costly investment procedures, also demonstrates a realisation of the 
importance of "learning-by-doing" and thus the need to systematise the learning 
procedures in order to maximise the benefits for the firm and minimise the 
costs of acquiring such learning. 
The Operations department recently set up at the Plant A has a more 
specific function: that of devising minor innovations into the production 
procedures of the plant in order to increase the technical efficiency of the 
installed machinery and thus to increase its productivity. In addition to the 
work of this department which as we have seen has already resulted in important 
productivity increases, the laboratory attached to the Quality Control department 
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has developed new products for the Mexican market without the aid of purchased 
foreign know-how or extremely sophisticated equipment. 
Plant B, together with the whole group to which it belongs is also engaged 
in reorganisation to maximise the performance of its»technical resources. The 
autonomy of this firm is to some extent limited by its association - formal and 
informal - with its foreign parent company. For this reason no new product 
research is undertaken in Mexico and the parent company's agreement is necessary 
for major items of policy or equipment acquisition. Nevertheless there has 
recently been a recognition within this firm of the importance of the two 
aspects of technical capacity mentioned with reference to Plant A - namely, new 
investment management and productivity of the existing facilities. With 
reference to the former aspect the firm has come to realise that the learning 
experience involved in setting up new plants cannot be obtained outside the 
context of the operating conditions of the plant, although the knowledge of new 
techniques and experience in negotiating with clients and management of the 
planning and implementation aspects of new projects is also important. The 
setting up of a Task Force to manage the new investment proposed in the North is 
intended to be an experiment to find the appropriate organisational form which 
will combine both technical knowledge on the part of the Head Office staff and 
the experience of operating conditions and problems held by the local staff. 
Significantly the new plant manager is to head up the Task Force and to be 
involved in the project management from the planning stages. 
Plant B's concern with productivity and process control is shown by the 
establishment of the Technical department. Although this appears to have been 
instigated by the parent company and the staff of the Technical department are 
being trained by personnel from the foreign firm, it nevertheless represents a 
rational approach to the problems of improving productivity at the plant and of 
training the local engineers in techniques of process control prior to the 
introduction of more sophisticated automation. 
Plant C is part of a group which has undergone extraordinary growth in 
recent years and is still in the process of reorganisation in order to manage 
both its expanded productive capacity and the sophisticated machinery and 
control systems it is purchasing from its machinery suppliers. As yet the 
organisation of the firm does not reflect a conscious attempt to separate out 
research, control and innovatory activity from operational production departments 
and there was no evidence to suggest that studies to improve productivity and 
efficiency (other than new maintenance systems) nor to improve control and 
learning from new investment management was a direct part of the firm's 
technical strategy. There was still a substantial reliance on foreign technical 
assistance both from the machinery suppliers and international consultants to 
solve technical problems and make good the firm's shortfall in technical 
capacity for design and implementation of new productive capacity and new systems 
of production control. However there was considerable, and in the Mexican 
context, unusual emphasis on new product development and the functions of the 
quality control laboratories had been extended from the operational functions 
common to the other plants to include a substantial amount of research and 
development activity for new product development. 
Plant D,which is the most up-to-date plant in terms of technology and 
process control systems employed, relies to a very large extent on the technical 
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resources of its parent company. The firm has no overt strategy of systematic 
learning through autonomous activities in investment management, productivity 
innovations and new product developments. All technical know-how and experience 
in these matters is obtained from the international group which owns this plant. 
In spite of this the firm's local staff receives intense training both at the 
parent company's headquarters and at the plant itself. Such training is related 
with the management of the modern equipment and control systems, all of which 
results in a net increase in the technical capacity of the personnel concerned. 
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Section V 
LEVEL OF TECHNOLOGY AND INTERNAL TECHNICAL CAPACITY IN 
THE MEXICAN CEMENT INDUSTRY 
In this paper we have examined the structure of the Mexican cement industry, 
the level of technology and the channels of technology transfer to the industry 
and have discussed various indicators of technical capacity within each firm. We 
have found that the level of technology incorporated into the industry did not 
diverge from the standard process technology used by the industry at an 
international level, with the exception of innovations such as the Japanese-
developed precalcination system which has not as yet won universal acceptance in 
the cement producing field. The greatest differences in technology between the 
different Mexican producers relates not to core technology but to process control 
techniques such as automation systems and quality control and maintenance systems. 
In this respect we found that there was considerable reluctance in the Mexican 
industry to adopt process control systems, - especially automation and, to some 
extent, programmed preventive maintenance systems - with the exception of those 
firms which were strongly linked with foreign firms whose activities in the 
cement field were centred on sophisticated process control techniques. 
Although the core technology used in cement production (see Monograph 
One) and incorporated into the Mexican industry is clearly exclusive to the 
cement industry, many methods of process control and quality control are common 
to different branches of industry. Nevertheless the case study at an industry 
level enables us to see how such innovations which have been developed in the 
context of the international industry, together with innovations in cement-related 
process technology, are incorporated into the local industry, and what limitations 
these impose on the possibility of domestic innovatory and research activity. 
The analysis contained in this paper illustrates the predominance of 
imported technology in the cement sector, as well as the external origin of both, 
core technology and the application of control systems. However within these 
structural limitations we have seen that there are areas in which local innovation 
is not only possible but in a sense essential if local producers are to be able 
to make their imported production systems effective in their actual locations in 
Mexico. In at least two firms we saw evidence of how systematic monitoring and 
studying of the operation of major and minor parts of the process machinery has 
led to an increase in the productivity of different machines, and ultimately to 
an improvement in the efficiency and in the effective output capacity of the plant 
as a whole. It is important to stress that this kind of innovatory activity, 
which differentiates the passive importer of technical systems and equipment 
from the active integrator of technology, is not dependent upon the geographical 
source of the equipment or know-how utilised. 58/ 
58/ In Mexico, as in other Latin American countries, serious consideration 
is at present being given to the domestic production of capital goods. Among 
them those demanded by the cement industry (this industry is being studied as 
part of a wider program sponsored by UNIDO, and being carried out in 
conjunction with various research departments of Nacional Financiera S.A.). Such 
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Throughout this papar we hav« Used ^rio*s indicators to assess technical 
capacity in local cement firms. Imnovatory activity in various aspects of 
production control and prçduct development was just one of these indicators. 
Others included the organisation of t;echniÀl departments within the firm and 
their rationality with reference to fehe tawinical functions demanded by production, 
the number of qualified technical staff s«fvin>| the technical departments, and 
the relative autonomy of trie firm vis-a-vi^ thç machinery supplier and outside 
consultants in the selection of new investment^capacity and the organisation of 
new investment projects. We also stressed jthat the technical capacity of a firm 
should be assessed in relation to tha situiftio* of that firjn - the kind of 
technology and process control employed byfthe!;firm, the rate of growth and thus 
the frequency of new investments and *the pLgrti^ ular objectives of the firm at any 
period in time with regard* to compet^tio^i itf new product development and long 
tern technical strategy, etc. ,In thg contLct ;$f these factors which can alter 
the kind of technical capacity relevant toy,a particular firm at a particular time 
we can abstract an aspect of technical capfcçity' which in a sense redefines the 
meaning of innovation and technical leamïfrg; in the Mexican context: what we are 
trying to assess in this «situation is, the Ibility to maximise the technical 
learning opportunity provided by the1 acquisition of imported technology in order 




The concept of technical capacity we«have built up in relation to Mexican 
cement firms is a far cry from the cryde i<fea of Latin American firms being 
passive receptors of imported technology. 'Howçver we have also observed 
substantial differences between firms- and <ian therefore generate some tentative 
hypotheses regarding the kinds of Situations which are conducive to the 
development of local technical capacity and those which tend to restrict or at 
any rate not to stimulate such developments. 
One of the factors which has evidently h^d a great effect upon the Mexican 
cement firms hereby studied is the role of'the foreign parent companies and, to 
policy option has its own merits in terms of balance of payments effects, as well 
as in terms of the learning opportunity ancji- the linkages with the steelmaking and 
heavy engineering sector. Also, and regardless of how the technology for the 
cement capital goods production is acquired, the net effect of such policy option 
on the technical capacity of the capital goods sector must be positive. 
However in terms of the kinds of innovatory activities we have been 
concerned with here -which cqnsist of relevant knowledge and technical know-how 
necessary to plan investment projects, select technology, manage and control the 
project through the whole construction phase arid operate that series of capital 
goods in the manner most productive ip. the - particular situation of thé plant,such 
innovation and technical capacity is not affected by the possibility of local 
manufacture of capital goods. If all core ¿technology were fabricated in Mexico 
the same problems of investment management * plant control and productivity 
improvement would be posed at plant level tl^ e individual cement producer. 
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a lesser extent, of foreign consultants. In the case of the two firtns, B and D 
in our sample - both subsidiaries of foreign firms - we observed that the 
presence of foreign participation does not necessarily have a similar effect in 
all cases. Both Mexican firms had a formal technical assistance contract with 
their parent companies and both had considerable communication and guidance from 
headquarters. However, in the case of firm D the role of the parent company was 
much more active and direct; none of the former technical staff at the plant 
before the foreign firm took over had been retained, and the plant, together with 
its technology and management methods, had been entirely re-designed according to 
the practice of the parent company. All technical problems which were outside 
routine operational circumstances were referred to the parent company and there 
was a constant interchange of personnel for advice/training between the two firms. 
Whatever development of technical capacity there was in terms of training and 
experience of the local personnel, came as a by-product of the main functions of 
the organisation of the firm and plant. Plant B, on the other hand, has been in 
existance since the beginning of the century and has always coexisted with its 
British parent company. This firm too has a formalised technical assistance 
contract with the parent company and relies on the parent company for non-
routine technical analysis and for certain laboratory and testing facilities 
which do not exist in the firm's laboratories in Mexico. There is also 
considerable interchange of personnel for training and consultancy purposes. 
However the change in the company's ownership structure - i.e. the reduction of 
the British company's holdings to less than fifty percent, together with the 
amalgamation with one of Mexico's largest construction conglomerates - has 
given an impetus towards the rational development of the firm's own technical 
capacity and the organisation of its technical departments, with the explicit 
purpose of increasing the sphere of technical independence. All this illustrates 
how the firm has been able to develop its own technical capacity in spite of its 
close links and technical assistance contract with its parent company. 
In order to understand more clearly the difference between the situation of 
these two subsidiaries we need to understand quite a lot more about the nature of 
the respective parent companies. As we mentioned earlier in this paper the 
company which partially owns Plant D is a Swiss multinational whose activities 
in the cement field are characterised by the application of sophisticated process 
control and automation techniques. Traditionally this company has been operating 
mainly in South and East Africa and in Europe but during the last ten years it 
has made a substantial inroad into Latin America. Apart from a number of 
technical assistance contracts with firms in which it has no capital participatory 
relationship, this company has investments in cement plants in Costa Rica, Peru, 
Brazil, and Colombia, as well as in Mexico. These investments are comparatively 
recent, and the pattern of intervention nearly always follows the path taken at 
Mexico's Firm D - namely,once participation has been bought the firm is expanded 
and completely modernised very often abandonning the old productive capacity in 
favour of a totally sophisticated and integrated modern plant. 
The British company on the other hand, though traditionally one of the 
market leaders in the international cement industry does not have the dynamic 
technical profile that the Swiss company has. The British company has much 
production experience in East and West Africa and in the former Asian colonies, 
and more recently has invested in the Middle East. However the process control 
and automation systems used at its plants are largely purchased from other 
companies rather than developed directly by the firm itself. Moreover its long 
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association with the Mexican firm gave way to a most special relationship. The 
Mexican firm has established certain areas of autonomy over the years, 
particularly in earlier periods where the firm was the market leader in Mexico 
with little competition from other companies threatening either its market share 
or its reputation for quality of product. -The intensification of competition in 
the late 1960's and the 1970's has altered that situation and made it necessary 
for the Mexican firm to revise its technical standards and seek ways to improve 
its efficiency. This has been done partly with the assistance of the parent 
company - hence the technical assistance contract - and partly on the basis of 
the firm's preexisting technical departments., In this situation it just could 
not happen that the foreign firm found itself free to completely reorganise the 
plants or replace all existing technical staff, as happened in Firm D. 
There is also variation between technical capacity of firms not connected 
with foreign capital. In this study we observed how the firm which was 
organised as a cooperative not only developed an extremely independent and self-
reliant attitude towards minor innovations, new product development and investment 
management, but was also less concerned with the substitution of labour by 
sophisticated control methods, and more interested in improving the productivity 
of labour by improving working conditions and workers' motivations towards 
efficiency of the plant. 
Government policy towards technology transfers and acquisitions in many 
Latin American countries is mainly concerned with the regulation of payments for 
technical assistance contracts, patents and licences which has been a major 
source of profit repatriation for multinational companies in the past. While 
this is a necessary area for government action it is also necessary for national 
technology policies to go beyond negative restrictive measures to create 
legislation and operative norms which positively stimulate the development of 
indigenous technical capacity both in the private sector as well as in government-
sponsored research institutions. One aspect of this would be to ensure that those 
civil servants employed to monitor imports of technology and know-how and their 
relevant payments should have sufficient knowledge of the sector and processes 
involved to be able to assess whether the technology being acquired, the manner 
in.which it is to be used, etc., will stimulate the development of internal 
technical capacity of the importing firm. This is particularly important with 
reference to the purchasing of automation systems or other systems for which not 
only the hardware (computer) but also the software (programmes) are purchased 
from external sources. In such a situation there is a danger that the software 
would turn to be inappropriate to the production situation of the purchasing firm 
which does not possess sufficient internal technical capacity to make good the 
discrepancy (the case of Firm C in our sample). There is also another kind of 
problem attached to the importing of systems for which the data and software is 
supplied externally. This is the case when the importing firm is so dependant 
on the foreign supplier for the continuing provision of information, programmes 
and technical assistance to make the system operative that there is little 
indication that an effective technology transfer is taking place in the sense 
that local national technical personnel are acquiring the skills and experience 
necessary , to dispense, in a reasonable time period, with the external technical 
assistance. 
The Mexican legislation on the transfer of technology, although 
representing an important step forward in an attempt to devise a relevant policy 
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on regulating technology transfer to Mexican industry fails to take note of a 
major issue in this field; that is the transfer of know-how and skills implicit 
in a purchase of productive equipment from a machinery supplier. According to 
the legislation only technology which is paid for separately from an equipment 
purchasing contract is under the terms of reference of the law so that the whole 
area of investment planning and management is excluded from consideration. By 
analogy, the installation of control systems -maintenance and automation - are 
also excluded from the terms of the legislation. Such a hiatus in the control of 
importing of technology should be rectified but can only be effectively controlled 
when the personnel with sufficient knowledge of industrial sectors and industrial 
control processes are available to the government. 
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Tabic 1: The Mcxican cctncnt industry: 
distribution of installed capacity, market shares and production, 1973 
Companics and plañe 
locations Ñame of factory/firro 
Installed capacity 
a/ b / 
Tons- Z -
Production 
r b' Ions— J — 
I. Tolteca group 
1) Atontonilco, Hgo. Div. AüonConilco de Tula' 1,320,000 10.1 880 ,007 
2) Tolteca, Hgo. Div, Tolteca 669,900 5.1 504 ,941 4.4 
3) Zapotiltic, Jal. Div. Jalisco 495,000 3.8 535 ,251 4.7 
4) El Fuerte, Sin. Cementos.Sinaloa S.A. 330,000 2.5 380 ,274 3.3 
5) Mixcoac, D.F. Div. Mixcoac 313,500 2.4 235 ,050 2.1 
6) Marmol, Sin. Cementos del Pacífico S.A. 165,000 1.3 152 ,084 1.3 
7) Puebla, Pue. Cementos Atoyac S.A. 132,000 1.0 154 ,860 1.4 
8) Hermosillo, Son. Cementos Portland Nacional S.A. 112,200 0.9 104 ,121 
T O T A L 3,537,600 27.2 2,946 ,588 25.8 
II. Cementos Mexicanos group 
í) Monterrey, N.L. Unidad Monterrey 1,386,000 10.7 845 ,695 7.4 
2) LeSn, Gto. Cementos Maya S.A., Div. Cementos 
Portland 
495,000 3.8 496 ,056 4.3 
3) Torre&n, Coah. Unidad Torreon 330,000 2.5 340 ,120 3.0 
4) Herida, Yuc. Div. Mérida 207,900 1.6 218 ,015 1.9 
5) Valles, S.L.P. Unidad Valles 165,000 1.3 173 ,457 1.5 
6) Tlaquepaque Cementos Cuadalajara S.A. 660,000 5.1 560 ,374 4.9 
7) Ensenada B.C. Cementos Cuadalajara, Div. Cementos 
California Sj 
189,750 1.5 355 227 3.1 
8) Monterrey, N.L. Cementos del Norte - - -
T O T A L 3,433,650 25.5 2,988 944 26.1 
111. Anahuac group 
I)'Barrientos, Méx. Cementos Anahuac S.A. 1,914,000 14.7 1,371 220 12.0 
2) Tamuin, S.L.P. Cementos Anahuac del Golfo S..A. — 660,000 5.1 691 615 6.0 
T 6 T A L 2,571,000 19.8 2,062 835 18.0 
IV. Cruz Azul -group 
1) Cruz Azul, Hgo. Cruz Azul S.C.L. Hgo. 973,500 7.5 920 830 8.0 
2) Lagunas, Oax. Cruz Azul S.C.A. Oax. 495,000 3.8 477 788 4.2 
T O T A L 1,468,500 11.3 1,398 618 12.2 
V. Apasco group 
1) Apasco, Méx. Cementos Apasco S.A. 680,4601/ 5.2 807 991 7.1 
2) Orizaba, Ver. Cementos Veracruz S.A. 297,0001/ 2.3 296 720 2.6 
T O T A L 977,460 7.5 1,104 711 9.7 
VI • Chihuahua group 
1) Chihuahua, Chi. Cementos Chihuahua 297,000 2.3 212 917 1.9 
2) Ciudad Juárez* Chi • Cementos Chihuahua 115,500 0.9 89, 671 0.8 
T O T A L 412,500 3.2 302, 588 2.6 
VII. Independents 
1) Hidalgo, N.L. Cementos Hidalgo S.C.L. 264,000 2.0 282, 596 2.5 
2) Acapulco, Gto. Cementos de Acapulco 198,000 1.5 167, 289 1.5 
3) Cuernavaca, Mor. Cemento Portland 145,200 1.1 166. 083 1.4 
T O T A L «07,200 4.7 615, 968 5.4 
« B O L E C O U N T R Y 13,010,910 100 11,430, 252 100 
Sources: Capacity: Calculated from Table 6 p. 28, El Mercado de Valores. Suplemento al N- 11, 1976, 
"Aspectos basicos para la proftramacion de la industria del cemonto". Production: Calculated from figures 
published by the Camara Kacional del Ccmento, Produccion de Cenento Portlnnd Gris, Mexico D.F,, 1975. 
a/ Tonn: oil noanuremcnta in this pnper nro in terms of metric tons (tonne«:), b/ aJI in this 
table are calculated as X of Total industry capacity or production, cj This plant, although part of the 
Cementos Mexicanos group is excluded because it produces mainly blast furnace slog cement using clinker 
produced at the Monterrey plant of Ceaentos Mexicanos. Total installed capacity at Cementos del Norte is 
264,000 tpy. dj Denotes plants in the process of expansion and near completion at December 1975. 
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Table 2: Demand for cement in Mexico: 
total consumption. 1940-1975 
(metric tons) 
„ National domestic Year . production Imports Exports 
Total apparent 
consumption 
1940 484,992 4,476 949 488,519 
1945 808,318 108,958 917,276 
1950 1,387,544 2,956 21,325 1,369,175 
1955 2,085,652 873 49,610 2,036,915 
1960 3,086,162 314 920 3,085,520 
1965 4,198,546 52 1 "4,198,597 
1970 7,179,981 3,449 97,837 7,085,593 
1971 7,362,419 3,896 158,708 7,207,607 
1972 8,602,196 2,609 267,070 8,337,735 
1973 9,787,269 1,370 168,668 9,616,971 
1974 10,594,918 3,24$ 196,096 10,402,071 
1975 11,611,956 n.a. n.a. n.a. 
Source: Cámara Nacional del Cemento: Datos estadísticos sobre producción, 
importación, exportación y consumo de cemento gris en la República Mexicana 
1935-68. 
Table 3: Growth of productive capacity. 1940-1974 
(metric tons and percentages) 
Year Total installed capacity ®J 
_ _ , , ^. Capacity utilisation Total production 
1940 564,300 484,992 85.9 
1945 1,156,650 808,316 69.9 
1950 1,999,800 1,387,544 69.4 
1955 2,768,700 2,085,652 75.3 
1960 3,908,850 3,086,126 79.0 
1965 5,136,450 4,198,546 81.7 
1970 8,837,400 7,179,981 81.2 
1971 9,764,700 7,362,419 75.4 
1972 10,647,450 8,602,196 80.8 
1973 12,858,450 9,743,175 75.8 
1974 13,254,450 10,594,918 79.2 
Source: See Table 2. 
a/. To be consistent we have recalculated all capacity estimates on the 
basis of 330 working days per year which is the standard measurement nos used. 
However such a standard is unrealistic up to the I960's and consequently 
capacity utilisation is underestimated for the earlier years. 
- 60 -
Tabic 4: Relative chances in market shares of major cement groups 
and other companies 1965-1975 according to production 








Tods X of total 
1975 
Tons 2 of total 
1. Tolteca 1, ,112, ,912 26.8 1 .795, ,419 25.2 2, ,946, ,588 25.7 
2. Cementos 
Mexicanos 
357, ,925 8.6 858, ,727 12.1 2, ,988, ,944 26.1 
3. Anahuac 512, ,053 12.3 , 1 ,000, ,692 14.1 2, ,062, ,835 18.0 
4. Apasco 386, ,862 9.3 597, ,055 8.4 1, ,104, ,711 9.6 
5. Cruz Azul 460, ,085 11.5 797, ,193 11.2 1, ,398, ,618 12.2 
6. Others 1, ,321, ,196 31. ß 2 ,071, ,147 29.1 948, ,028 8.2 
W1I0LE INDUSTRY' 4, ,151, ,033 100 7, ,120, ,233 100 11, ,449, ,7 24 100 
Source: See table's 1 and 2. 
a/ The relative loss of markets by the firms not part of any of the five main groups is 
partly explained by the faster growth of the nain groups and partly by the fact that many 
previously independent companies were absorbed by t.fie major groups during the decade under 
analysis. 
Table 5: Relative changes in market shares of major cement groups 
and other companies 1965-1975 according to installed capacity 




















1. Tolteca 1,407, ,450 29.3 2 ,247,300 26.5 3, ,537, ,600 27.2 
2, Cementos 
Mexicanos 
429, ,000 8.9 966,900 11.4 3, ,433, ,650 26.4 
3. Anahuac 594, ,000 12.4 1 ,171,500 13.8 2, ,571, ,000 19.8 
4. 'Apasco 470, ,250 9.8 833,250 9.8 977, ,460 7. J 
5. Cruz Azul 488, ,400 10.2 907,500 10.7 1 , ,488, ,500 11.3 
6. Others 1.417, ,350 29.5 2, ,364,450 27.8 1 , ,022, ,700 7.9 
WHOLE INDUSTRY 4,806, ,450 100 8, ,490,900 100 13, ,030, ,910 100 
Source and notes: See table 4. 




ceneni. groups 1965-1975 










1. Tolteca 10.2 10.0 10.4 9.6 9.8 9.5 
2. Cementos 
Mexicanos 
24.0 19.1 28.0 23.0 s 17.7 29.0 
3. Anahuac 16.0 14.3 15.6 15.8 14.5 17.0 
4. Apasco 11.0 9.1 13.1 7.5 11.3 6.9 
5. Cruz Azul 11.7 11.6 11.8 11.7 13.2 10.1 
6. Others -3.3 9.4 -14.7 -3.2 10.8 -15.4 
WHOLE INDUSTRY 10.9 11.4 9.9 10.5 12.0 8.9 
Source : See tables 4 and 5. 
a/ Growth rates are average annal cumulative growth rates. 
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Tafele 7: H«xic«n crarnt induntry: regional distribution of production 1973 
(netrie to»ir nnd pareen tngew.) 
Region, group and plant Production tons 
Capacity. 
tons 
Production as X of 
regional production 
Capacity as Z of 
regional capacity 
I. CENTRAL DICCION 5,537,078 6,643,560 100 .0 100.0 

























2. Cementos Mexicanos SUB-TOTAL 496,096 495,000 9 .0 7.4 
LeSn, Cto. 496,096 495,000 9 .0 7.4 
3. Anahuae SUB-TOTAL 1,371,220 1,914,000 24 .8 28.8 
Barrientos, Hex. 1,371,220 1,914,000 24 .8 26.8 
A . Crüz Arul SUB-TOTAL 920,830 973.500 16 .6 14.7 
Jasso, HgO. 920,830 973,500 16 .6 14.7 
5. Apasco SUB-TOTAL 807,991 680,460 14 .6 10.2 
Apasco, Hex. 807,991 680,460 14 .6 10.2 
7. Independents SUB-TOTAL 166,083 145,200 3 .0 2.2 
Cuernavaca, Kor. 166,083 145,200 3 .0 2.2 
II. INTERMEDIATE CENTRAL REGION 865,072 825,000 lOO .0 ' 100.0 
2. Ceoentos Mexicanos SUB-TOTAL 173,457 165,000 20 .0 20.0 
Valles, S.L.P. 173,457 165,000 20 .0 20.0 
3. Anahuae SUB-TOTAL 691,615 660.000 80 .0 80.0 
Taauin, S.L.P. 691,615 660,000 80.0 80.0 
III. CENTRAL NORTHERN REGION 307,390 412,500 100. .0 100.0 
6. Grupo Chihuahua SUB-TOTAL 307,390 412,500 100, .0 100.0 
Chihuahua, Chi. 











IV. N.E. RF.CION 1,468,411 1,980,000 100 .0 100.0 













7. Independents SUB-TOTAL 282,596 264,000 19, .2" 13.3 
Hidalgo, N.L. 282,596 264,000 19, .2 13.3 
V. K.tf. REGION. «26,202 796,950 100. .0 100.0 
1. Tolteca SUB-TOTAL 636,452 607,200 77. .0 76.2 


















2. Cementos Mexicanos SUB-TOTAL 189,750 189,750 a/ 23. ,0 23.8 
Ensenada, B.C. 189,750 189,750 23. ,0 23.8 
VI. S.W, REGION 1,262,914 1,353,000 100, ,0 100.0 
1. Tolteca SUB-TOTAL 535,251 495,000 42, .4 36.6 
Zapotiltic, Jal. 535,251 495,000 42. .4 36.6 
2. Cementos Mexicanos SUB-TOTAL 560,374 660,000 44. ,4 48.8 
Tlaquepaque, Jal. 560,374 660,000 44. ,4 48.8 
7. Independents SUB-TOTAL 167,289 198,000 13. .2 14.6 
Acapulco Cto. 167.289 198,000 13. ,2 14.6 
•VII. SOUTHERN REGION 477,788 495,000 100. 0 100.0 
3. Cruz _A^ ul. SUB-TOTAL 477,788 495,000 100. 0 100.0 
Lagunas, Oax. , 477,788 495,000 100. 0 100.0 
Vili . GULF REC ION 296,720 297,000. 100. ,0 100.0 
5. Apasco SUB-TOTAL 296,720 297,000 100.0 100.0 
Orizuba, Ver. 296,720 297,000 100. 0 100.0 
IX. PENN1NSL1AR 218,015 207,900 100. 0 100.0 
2. Cementos M'-xicanofi SUB-TOTAL 218,015 ¿07,900 100. 0 100.0 
Herida, Yuc. 218,015 207,900 100. 0 100.0 
WHOLE COl'NTRY: T O T A L 11,259,590 13,010,910 
Sr.urre; Calculate.) from ' 'Aspectos basico» para la programación de ]a industria del cemento"; El Mercado de ValoreB. aiio 1 » •*U(>ienpiito h- 11 (]e 1970. 
a,/ Exnct production fi^ur es for this plant are not known.-
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Table 8: Regional structuré of production, consumption and 
installed capacity of Mexican cement industry 1975 
(percentages) 





1. Central 48.4 51.3 45.7 
Distrito Federal 2.1 2.4 24.9 
Mexico 19.0 19.8 8.0 
Morelos 1.5 1.1 1.8 
Guanajuato 4.3 3.8 3.5 
Querétaro - - 1.6 
Hidalgo 20.1 23.2 1.8 
Puebla 1.4 1.0 3.4 
Tlacala - - 0.7 
2. Intermediate Central 7.6 6.3 3.3 
Zacatecas - - 0.8 
San Luis Potosí 7.6 6.3 1.6 
Aguascal'ientes - - 0.9 
3. North Central 2.6 3.2 4.2 
Chihuahua 2.6 3.2 2.9 
Durango — - 1.3 
4. North East 12.9 15.1 12.4 
Nuevo León 9.9 12.6 6.5 
Coahuila 3.0 2.5 2.2 
Tamaulipas - - 3.7 
5. North West 7.7 6.0 9.0 
Baja California 3.1 1.4 2.6 
Baja California S. - - 0.5 
Sonora 0.9 0.8 2.4 
Sinaloa 4.7 3.8 2.8 
Nayarit - - 0.7 
6. South West 11.1 10.4 13.1 
Jalisco 9.6 8.0 5.8 
Colima - - 0.8 
Mihoacan - - 3.8 
Guerrero 1.5 1.5 2.7 
7. South 4.2 3.8 3.9 
Oaxaca 4.2 3.8 2.2 
Chiapas - - 1.7 
8. Gulf 2.6 2.3 6.7 
Veracruz 2.6 2.3 5.4 
Tabasco - - 1.3 
9. Penninsülar 1.9 1.6 1.7 
Campeche - - 0.3 
Yucatán 1.9 1.6 1.2 
Quintana Roo - - 0.2 
Source: Calculated from "Aspectos básicos para la programación de la industria del cemento"; 
El Mercado de Valores, Año XXXVI, Suplemento al N- 11 de 1976, Table 7, p. 31 and Table 6, pp. 28-30. 
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Figure 1: Regional market division 
Source: El mercado de valores, Año XXXVI, Suplemento al N- 11, 
México, marzo 15 de 1976. 
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Figure 2: Market diferentiation 
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Figure 3: Technical parameters of five cement plants in Mexico 
Unit of 
measurement 
Plant Plant Plant Plant Plant 











cement 120 135 -
1 125 112 110 
Labour utilisation Man hours/ 






1.65 1.75 1.6 1.62 1.6 
Source: Information given at company interviews. 
Note: These figures, although given in good faith are not strictly 
comparable because of differences in production conditions and definitions, i.e. 
some of the labour utilisation figures include maintenance and quarry labour while 
others include only one of these activities. Differences in distribution methods 
also affect labour utilisation. In addition some firms include non-contract 
labour in their calculations of labour utilisation whilst others only use those on 
the permanent payroll. Further research would be necessary to eliminate these 
discrepancies and make the figures strictly comparable. Nevertheless they do 
give a good idea of orders of magnitude of the different technical parameters and 
in spite of interfirm differences in definitions etc., they also indicate which 
plants are the most efficient, which is useful in relation to the rest of the 
analysis on technical capacity and level of technology. 
a/ The high power utilisation at this plant is partly explained by the 
changeover from one frequency to another during the period for which figures were 
obtained. Also the relatively low capacity utilisation at this plant increases 
this and other indicators of technical efficiency, in spite of the large scale of 
production at the plant. 
- 66 -
Figure 4: Summary of newest technology used by five of 
the largest cement plants in Mexico 1976 













































700 c/ 2,000 1,350 2,500 1,850 
Source: Company interviews and El Mercado de Valores, Año XXXVI, Suplemento 
al N- 11, Marzo 15, 1976, Table 4, pp. 24-26. 
a/ Tpy = tons per year, 
b/ Tpd = tons per day. 
c/ New kiln of 2,400 currently being installed. 
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Figure 5: Organisation of technical departments. Firm A 
N = Number of qualified engineers in each department. 
Total number of engineers: 30 
Capacity of plant: 973,500 tpy. 
Ratio of engineers to plant capacity: 1 engineer per 32,450 tpy. 
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Figure 5: Organisation of technical departments. Firm A 
N = Number of qualified engineers in each department. 
Total number of engineers: 36 
Capacity of plant: 1,320,000 tpy. 
Ratio of engineers to capacity: 1 per 36,660 tpy. 
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Figure 5: Organisation of technical departments. Firm A 
N = Number of qualified engineers in each department. 
Total number of engineers: 30. 
Capacity: 1,386,000 tpy. 
Ratio of engineers to plant capacity: 1 per 46,200 tpy. 
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